IACA INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACADEMY

MASTER IN ANTI-CORRUPTION STUDIES PROGRAMME

Impact of Political Corruption on Involuntary Migration: Containment through Supranational Collective Actions. A Case Study of Nigeria

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2022

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This publication is an adaptation of the master's thesis submitted to fulfil the requirements for the Master in Anti-Corruption Studies degree at the International Anti-Corruption Academy

I pledge on my honour that I have not plagiarised, used unauthorised materials, given and/or received illegitimate help on this assignment, and hold myself accountable to the academic standards binding upon students of the IMACC programme.

Signature: Gbajumo, D. E. Date: 25 September 2022

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Abstract

Political corruption is a global plague with grave consequences on underdeveloped countries. Empirical evidence found that citizens of underdeveloped countries migrate to industrialised countries due to poverty in their countries of origin. This paper confirms the previous findings and adds that most underdeveloped countries are actually rich because of their enormous natural resources that earn them billions of United States dollars but they are impoverished by their political leaders, who divert their country's public funds for their private use at home and abroad. Consequently, their countries suffer underdevelopment resulting in the populace migrating in droves to industrialised countries for survival.

Using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests to analyse the survey and interview data collected from 142 adult Nigerians, this paper finds strong and positive statistically significant evidence that political corruption impacts involuntary emigration. This paper further finds that supranational collective actions could contain political corruption and, in turn, curb involuntary emigration by using public funds to establish functional development infrastructures for the good of all.

Key words: corruption, migration, political corruption, politics, collective actions, (under)development, Nigeria.

Word count: 20,896 **Geographical area:** Global

Acknowledgement

My profound appreciation goes to my beloved son, Master Treasure Adebunmi O. E. Gbajumo, and my lovely daughter, Miss Jewel Bukola U. D. Gbajumo, for their understanding and support during this phase of my life, when I have to share my time and other resources between my family, friends, work and study. I am also grateful to them for their guidance on how to use technology to develop anti-corruption games and videos; similar games and videos that they personally developed; and the educational awareness they raised for my anti-corruption initiative materials and website - https://www.integrityplus.org/.

I am grateful to my husband, Mr Osagie Ademulegun Gbajumo, for his encouragement and support to pursue my dream to undertake the International Master in Anti-Corruption Compliance and Collective Actions (IMAAC) at the International Anti-Corruption Academy. Though he is not physically here to celebrate this success with me today, he is celebrating and smiling on me from the heavens.

I thank all those that participated in the survey and interview for this study. Without you, this study would not have been completed. I also thank the International Migration Organization; the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs for their support with access to their data on human migration; and the World Bank for its support for access to data on its funded development projects.

My hearty appreciation goes to Mr Pawan Kumar Sinha, the Director of IACA, for his strict but supportive guidance and management of IMAAC; opportunities for our collaborations with other faculties at IACA; and the countless renowned professors and professionals across the globe that he lined up for the taught lessons during our programme. Many thanks too to IMAAC Coordinator and IACA staff for their

administrative support from the application to the completion of the programme and our graduation ceremony.

To the countless professors and professionals that taught me and my IMAAC colleagues, you are the brains behind the numerous renowned anti-corruption measures and books that we read and hear about out there! Learning directly from you was a climax for me, your work came alive during our lessons in class! Words are insufficient to express my gratitude to you all for sharing your knowledge with me and my colleagues during our study at IACA.

I am honoured for the privilege to walk my thesis journey under the supervision of Prof. Emeritus Michael Johnston. His useful hints broadened my knowledge on empirical research. I never thought research could be interesting until I worked with him on this study. I sincerely appreciate his patience and timely responses to my questions on how to navigate the obstacles that I encountered as well as the enormous space he gave me to dig for evidence to (dis-)prove my imaginations in anti-corruption! They paved the way for my successful completion of my journey and this paper. Thank-you, Prof. Johnston!

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Glossary

Corrupter	Anyone that gives money or money's worth to or requests public officials/politicians to (dis-)favour anyone in contravention of the requirements of his/her public office.
Corrupted/ corrupt official	Any political leader/public official who demands/receives any money or in-kind gifts/gratifications for doing or refraining from doing (dis-)favours to anyone in their official capacity.
Corruption-aiders/ abetters	Those that support corrupters and corrupt public officials to commit or benefit from corruption, including turning blind eyes to anti-corruption measures and creation of safe havens for corrupt proceeds.
Poverty	A lack of capability to fend/provide necessities for oneself or others under one's responsibility, including a lack of income and/or infrastructures for development.
Involuntary migration	Relocation/migration undertaken due to afflictions (poverty and other factors of underdevelopment) that result from political corruption.
Political corruption	theft, embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds; bribery, extortion, nepotism and conflict of interest to unduly benefit from public office; and money laundering of proceeds of the corruption.
Underdevelopment	Severe unemployment and underemployment, poverty, low per capita income, inequitable distribution of wealth/income, and a lack of adequate functional infrastructures

Introduction

Introduction

Corruption and migration are age-old ubiquitous issues that impact global economy (Agbu, 2003; Johnston, 2005; Kuo, 2015; Hatchard, 2020). Both corruption and migration are frequent topics in global fora and have birthed various laws and initiatives at enormous cost (OECD, 1997; UNODC, 2004; Okoja-Iweala, 2012; Hatchard, 2014; IOM, 2019; United Nations, 2022). However, the problems remain prevalent because political leaders entrusted with authority to enforce the laws are the perpetrators of corruption and controllers of the controls (Johnston, 1997; Okoja-Iweala, 2018; Hatchard, 2020). This paper posits that political corruption causes hardships that compel people to migrate (involuntary migration).

In West Africa, temporary and seasonal intra-regional mobility of male population for trade, security and other harsh environmental issues predate the definition of borders and colonialism of the region (Adepoju, 2005a; 2005b) Colonialism introduced economic and political barriers, such as imposition of tax regimes, boundaries in each territory, laws on compulsory recruitment, employment contracts, and forced labour (Adepoju, 2005a, p. 1) to mobility in the region. The control measures by the colonialists were merely to keep a hold on supply to exploit what could have been free mobility of labour. In contemporary times, though intra-regional mobility is facilitated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the political and commercialised migration tenets set by the colonial rulers remain in force for migration from the region to developed economies – mainly North America and Western Europe (Adepoju, 2005a; Agbu, 2003; van den Bersselaar & Decker, 2011).

Empirical studies (Adepoju, 2005a; 2005b; Antwi & Nahanga, 2014; Akinyetu, 2016; Anetoh & Onwudinjo, 2020) indicate that most migrants to industrialised countries escape from the ghastliness of impoverishment in their underdeveloped countries.

Their flight from their countries is for survival in developed countries, where they are often compelled – due to a lack of better alternatives - to accept jobs under people with lesser educational and professional capabilities (Anetoh & Onwudinjo, 2020; Ossai, et al., 2020; Ojo, et al., 2011; Olorunfemi, et al., 2020) or engage in sexual exploitation, prostitution and other debased tasks (Agbu, 2003; Adepoju, 2005b). Ironically, most underdeveloped countries are not poor but impoverished by their political leaders and public officials, who steal and launder their countries' public resources to industrialised countries (Daniel, 2012; Aloko & Abdullahi, 2018). For instance, Nigeria earns billions of United States dollars from its enormous natural resources, including petroleum (Ogri, 2001; Ehinomen & Adeleke, 2012; Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, 2021), and solid minerals, including diamonds, gold, silver, baryte, bitumen, steel (magnetite, goethite and chromium), coal and limestone), lithium, gypsum ((Janse, 2007; Ministry of Mines and Steel Development, 2021). These minerals are extracted by companies from industralised countries and exported to industrialised countries, where they are refined and exported from industrialised countries back to underdeveloped countries. Nigeria also receives millions of dollars in loans and grants from multinational development institutions and foreign countries for establishment or maintenance of number of critical development infrastructures. Notwithstanding the incomes and loans, Nigeria has been unable to transcend socio-economical impoverishment and underdevelopment. Nigeria remains entwined in severe lack of infrastructures in all its sectors because of political corruption – bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation, money laundering, extortion, nepotism, and conflict of interest. The political corruption allows politicians to divert public incomes and loans to their private pockets at home and abroad (Ajie & Wokekoro, 2012; Awojobi, 2014; Babalola, 2014; Aloko & Abdullahi, 2018).

Political corruption violates all 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are reproduced in **Figure 1** below. The SDGs are agreed upon by all the 193 countries-members of the United Nations. About 181 of the countries, including Nigeria, are also signatories to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).

Figure 1 – The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals

However, political corruption remains prevalent and the brunt of its consequences is heavy on all. Though individual corrupters, corrupt public officials and their country-aiders and abetters benefit from political corruption in the short-term, political corruption inflicts immense suffering on all in the long-run (Johnston, 1997). The institutions in developed economies suffer from political corruption (Thompson, 2018) in underdeveloped countries as the budgets of developed countries are drained through their care for or preventive measures to bar migrants from their countries (Rankin, 2017; Africanews, 2021). Anti-corruption measures in developed countries-corruption-aiders and abetters are weakened as they continuously turn blind eyes to the constant influx of laundered stolen public funds from underdeveloped countries

into their economies. The migration destination-countries, however, also get a steady supply of cheap and easily-exploited labour – a strongly unjust situation but one that benefits the destination-countries. The country-owner of the stolen public funds is impoverished; its citizens languish in abject poverty or emigrate for survival in developed countries, where they are often resented and exploited for cheap labour or subjected to other debased tasks. When the laundered stolen public funds are eventually 'detected', the corrupt officials are imprisoned, if they are caught; the reputation of the corrupters and corrupted public officials as well as the country-corruption-aiders and abetters is ruined. Further, the corrupt public officials are subjected to use the dysfunctional infrastructures in times of dire need, as evidenced by the travel ban during Covid-19, when they were denied access to functional facilities in the recipient-countries of their laundered stolen public funds, and they had to use the deplorable medical facilities in their countries of origin. History also proves that it is difficult for industrialised countries to repatriate discovered laundered stolen public funds to underdeveloped countries, though the funds rightfully belong to underdeveloped countries. Why anti-corruption measures in industrialised countries do not prevent or promptly detect and return stolen public funds from underdeveloped countries is a topic for another study.

A different aspect also worth thinking about is Hirschman's exit/voice/loyalty framework (Hirchsman, 1970), which posits that people who are unsatisfied with a situation/relationship have two choices – exit/flight or voice/protest for reparation of the (perceived) anomaly. Hirschman's position supports the evidence detailed in this paper regarding flight/emigration of those who are unsatisfied with the political corruption and developmental problems created and/or maintained by political leaders in underdeveloped countries. Most of those who are unsatisfied with the deplorable situations in underdeveloped countries flee for survival in developed

countries. This flight/emigration, however, makes the *status quo* much easier for the "home" regimes to maintain.

This paper invokes SDG 17 – Partnerships for the [SDGs] goals – and calls for coordinated supranational collective actions to contain political corruption, with a view to achieve global development. Available studies have proven the feasibility of collective actions in resolution of widespread problems, including corruption in smaller groups (Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2011; Pieth, 2014; OECD, n.a.).

The impact of political corruption on migration and global development, as extrapolated in this paper, is depicted in **Figure 2** below.



Figure 2 – Political corruption-migration cycle

The political corruption-migration cycle above shows that political corruption leads to underdevelopment, poverty and migration. The outer factors also feed back to corruption and make it worse. The evidence gathered in this study supports that the first scenario is truer for underdeveloped countries; and the latter is more likely to be true for migration destination-countries. Nevertheless, all the factors intertwine to create and sustain an undesirable negative equilibrium, which this paper postulates could be surmounted through collective actions.

The relationship between political corruption, poverty, underdevelopment and involuntary migration

This paper defines "poverty" as a lack of income and/or infrastructures for development. Poverty results from political corruption because the latter drains public incomes, which could have been used to establish and maintain development infrastructures, into the private pockets of a few corrupt political leaders, public officials and their corrupt cohorts – countries/recipient of laundered stolen public funds (corruption aiders/abetters). This paper hypothesizes that political corruption is positively related to underdevelopment, poverty and migration - the more public funds are stolen and laundered by political leaders, the more underdevelopment, poverty and migration there will be. Empirical evidence discussed in this paper proves that (involuntary) migration is flight from poverty and underdevelopment.

Several empirical studies (Johnston, 1997; Ojukwu & Shopeju, 2010; Ajie & Wokekoro, 2012; Anetoh & Onwudinjo, 2020) have explored general corruption, migration and collective action, either separately or a mix of two of them. However, there is a dearth (if any study) in empirical literature on the impact of political corruption on emigration from Nigeria and other underdeveloped countries; how political corruption and the

consequential involuntary emigration impact global development; and how supranational collective action could facilitate containment of political corruption and involuntary migration. Using ANOVA tests to analyse the data collected via survey and interviews from 142 participants, this paper covers the gaps by examining the impact of political corruption on emigration from underdeveloped countries, using Nigeria as the case study, and ascertaining how supranational collective actions could help to combat political corruption, which, in turn, would contain involuntary emigration from underdeveloped countries.

Research questions

How does political corruption impact involuntary emigration from underdeveloped countries to developed countries?

How and why is supranational collective action necessary to contain political corruption and thereby reduce involuntary emigration from underdeveloped countries?

Hypotheses

1. Political corruption is positively related to emigration.

2. Political corruption has no relationship with emigration.

3. Supranational collective action could facilitate containment of political corruption. Conversely, corruption and emigration could make collective action for reform more difficult by compelling the departure of citizens and groups who might otherwise push hard for better domestic government policies.

Literature Review

Literature Review

The colossal corruption in Nigeria with its consequential underdevelopment has become a norm (Dike, 2003; Smith, 2007; van den Bersselaar & Decker, 2011; Agbiboa, 2013) but its bane is political corruption by those entrusted with authority to serve the populace. The prime cause of underdevelopment in Nigeria is the continuous theft of Nigeria's public funds and misuse of authority for personal gains by Nigeria political leaders as well as public officials. Consequently, Nigeria's populace languishes in abject poverty with perpetual food shortages and insecurity (Onimode, 1982; Ogri, 2001; Ukaegbu, 2007; Urien, 2012; Akinyetu, 2016).

Using Econometric estimations, Okey (2016) studied the emigration of physicians from 50 African countries, including Nigeria, between 1995 and 2004 and found that corruption contributed to emigration of physicians – the higher the level of corruption in the countries studied, the higher the rate of emigration of physicians - due to low income rates, a situation that could be corrected by curbing corruption. The findings were corroborated by Anetoh and Onwudinjo (2020) in their study of emigration and brain drain in Nigeria, and they added that poor leadership, poor economy and dysfunctional environmental structures were responsible for the emigration of Nigeria's intellectuals and innovators. In a study with 285 clinical medical students in a university in Nigeria, Ossai et al. (2020) found that 74.4% of the students prefer to do their specialisation training in Canada, United Kingdom and United States because of a lack of "good equipment/facilities and better remuneration/quality of life" in Nigeria (p. 995). The above findings were confirmed on 25 August 2021, when the Saudi Arabia government, working through a consultant firm, conducted recruitment of over 500 Nigerian medical specialists, including pediatric and orthopedic surgeons, obstetricians and gynecologists, anesthesiologists, radiologists, hematologists, intensive care unit and other emergencies specialists. The specialists stated that their

willingness to accept recruitment offers by Saudi Arabia is due to poor health facilities, poor work conditions and flagrant failure by Nigeria's kakistocratic government to improve the situations (Tolu-Kolawole, 2021; Arise News, 2021; Sahara Reporters, 2021). On the whole, political corruption reduces returns on short- and long-term human capital in underdeveloped countries, as the educated and others in schools abscond education to flee poverty and underdevelopment for greener pastures in developed countries.

A review of political corruption, poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria and their relationship with emigration

a. Context of political corruption in Nigeria

Recalling the reported prevalence of political corruption in Nigeria (Oluwatobi, 2012; Imhonopi & Ugochukwu, 2013; Okolo & Raymond, 2014; Markovska & Adams, 2015; Umoru, 2017), actual cases of political corruption include Daniel's (2012) report regarding the $3-$5bn; $40m; £6m; $300m -$3.4bn and $21.33m stolen from Nigeria's public fund by Mr Sanni Abacha, then military president of Nigeria; Governors Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State; Joshua Dariye of Plateau State; James Ibori of Delta State and Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State (Ahemba, 2008) respectively. The above political corruption is only a tip of the iceberg. EFCC also found evidence to prosecute Ms Diezani Alison-Madueke, former Minister of Petroleum for over $90bn stolen from public funds while Mr Sambo Dasuki, former National Security Adviser, was indicted for stealing $2bn earmarked for procurement of arms for Nigeria (Sodiq, 2019); and the former Group Managing Director of Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Dr Andrew Yakubu, hid over $9.7m in a fire-proof safe in an unoccupied building in Kaduna State, where the EFCC recovered the money (Uwujaren, 2017). On 22 July 2022, the EFCC arraigned Mr Ahmed Idris, a

former Accountant General of Nigeria before a High Court in Abuja for stealing ₦109bn (about $192.8m) public funds between February and November 2021 (Bloomberg, 2022; EFCC, 2022). EFCC also confirmed that between 1960 and 2005, Nigerian military and political leaders stole $20 trillion from Nigeria's treasury (Vanguard, 2015).

A search with 'Nigeria' on the website of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) for recently leaked offshore companies returned 73 hits. Majority of the companies are in North America or administered as British Overseas Territories – 50 companies are registered in Bahamas, 7 in Cayman Islands, 5 in British Virgin Islands, 3 each in Bermuda and Barbados, 2 in Niue, and 1 each in Samoa and Saint Kitts and Nevis. Though the ICIJ did not respond to a request for names of owners of the companies during this research, it is certain that millions of Nigerians struggling to survive or emigrate to industrialised countries are not the owners of the companies. Similarly, those that engage in legal businesses proudly tie their names to their companies and success; and Investigative Journalists investigated to unveil the masked owners of the businesses.

Apart from corruption by political leaders, lower ranked public officials are not left out from stealing public funds. They have blamed various animals for eating public funds in their care (The Afrinik, n.a.). The currency-eating animals could be called 'monetævirous', following the naming convention for other species that eat plants or animals. Considering the peculiarity of monetævirous animals to Nigeria, it would be fair to coin a name for it in Nigerian language and 'örigho' (money-eater in Benin language) would suffice. In 2018, a salesclerk employed at the Joint Admissions and Matriculations Board (JAMB) in Benue State was reported to have informed auditors that a 'snake' swallowed ₦36m (equivalent to $100,000) from a vault in JAMB Office.

The money was the sale proceeds of examination cards purchased by students for entrance into universities in Nigeria. However, the clerk advised that she never said so and was never questioned by anyone regarding the money. In the same year, ₦70m given to the Northern Forum of Senators and entrusted to the chairman of the Forum was reportedly swallowed by monkeys at the Chairman's farmhouse. Why the ₦70m was "given" to the Forum is a study for another day. In 2019, a gorilla reportedly swallowed ₦6.8m (equivalent to $19,000) entrance fees paid by visitors to a Zoo in Kano state - Nigeria's public funds in the care of Kano Zoological Gardens - though there has never been a gorilla in the Zoo. In 2020, 50 goats were reported to have eaten ₦50bn ($129m) that Nigeria government had earmarked for charities. In 2022, termites reportedly ate ₦17.1bn, being Nigeria's public funds at the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund. Though the above cover-ups are ridiculous, demand for accountability is rare in Nigeria due to nepotism.

b. Oligarchy, cultism and nepotism in Nigeria politics

Nigeria's political terrain is managed by a few individuals, mainly from Yoruba and Fulani-Hausa tribes. The two tribes alternate Nigeria's presidency, particularly since the country returned to democracy in 1999. They maintain their oligarchy of Nigeria political power (Uweru, 2010; Olocha, 2017) through cultism and thuggery, and by appointing only their loyalists as heads of strategic positions in public service – security (military, police, department of state security services, correctional services, etc.), Central Bank, Customs, NNPC, Election Commission, EFCC and other anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria. The political system in Nigeria is rotational and nepotic, the cycle revolves round the clique and their loyalists who they initiate into the political terrain. Consequently, the political oligarchs control things in Nigeria, elections are only formalities (Omilusi, 2015) and accountability is a mirage.

The extent of political corruption by each political leader or public official could be measured, using their official salaries and allowances plus their declared legal businesses and/or investment interests minus their total spending plus available funds in their bank accounts and other legal and declared businesses.

$$C2 = \Sigma(S + S1) - \Sigma(A + B1+B2)$$

Where: C2 = unaccounted for funds/corrupt proceeds; S = Total official salaries and allowances; S1 = incomes from their legitimate and declared businesses and investment; A = spending on capital investments and current expenses; B1 = available funds in their known bank accounts; and B2 = known available funds not in bank. However, political successors do not demand accountability from their predecessors because the political power revolves round the same clique. They do not demand accountability from their predecessors so that their own successors do not demand accountability from them after their tenure in public office.

c. The underdevelopment situation in Nigeria

Per the World Bank, indicators of underdevelopment are unemployment and underemployment, low per capita income, inequitable distribution of wealth/income, lack of adequate and proper infrastructures – health, education, security, justice system, industries and other means of incomes, etc. - and poverty (Misra, 1964; Bhagwati, 1966; Dasgupta, 2003; The World Bank, 2022). These characteristics describe the situation of Nigeria, Africa, Asia and Latin America and account for why the populace keep emigrating to developed economies.

The United Nations' SDGs define the divide between industrialised and underdeveloped countries by the extent of technology and provision of enabling environment for survival of their populace – absence of poverty and hunger (SDGs 1

and 2 respectively), capability to afford good health and well-being (SDG 3) and quality education (SDG 4), access to employment opportunities in industry, innovation and infrastructure (SDG 9), and equalness based solely on merit (SDGs 5 and 10); the extent of cleanness and affordability of each country's water and sanitation, energy, climate, sea and land (SDGs 6, 7, 13, 14 and 15 respectively); and the extent of each country's strength to establish and sustain reliable institutions - peace and justice institutions (SDG 16), cities and communities (SDG 11), and consumption and production (SDG 12). The need for global partnership (SDG 17) to achieve the above development goals are enshrined in SDGs.

With the known trillions of United States dollars of Nigeria's public funds stolen by individual and collective political leaders, Nigeria could readily establish functional development infrastructures, which would, in turn, help contain involuntary emigration of its citizens to industrialised countries. Nigeria and most underdeveloped countries own more than three-quarters of the world's natural resources used for technological advancement but they are technologically poor (Aljazeera, 2022; UNEP, n.a.). The funds that could have been used to establish industries to produce technological equipment and other innovations in the country are stolen and laundered by the country's political leaders. For instance, Apple Technology Company, the manufacturer of the most expensive smartphones – iPhone, spent $10.3bn, comprising $6bn on machinery and equipment, $2.3bn for its stores, and $2bn for its land and buildings, to establish the company (Dediu, 2011). Apple had a total workforce of 154,000 employees (Macrotrends, 2022a) in 2021 and still made a net income of $94.68bn in 2021 (Macrotrends, 2022b). Nigeria could establish several similar companies with the $90bn public funds reported stolen by Ms Diezani, employed thousands of its citizens, and climb towards its accomplishment of the SDGs.

Apart from technological companies, the $90bn could have facilitated development in other areas. It could have built three of the biggest refineries on earth, as $30bn is budgeted to build the present biggest petroleum refinery in Jamnagar, India (ET EnergyWorld, 2016; iQ, 2013). Nigeria was the 7th largest crude petroleum exporter in 2020 (OEC, 2020) but spent $37.9bn to import refined petrol between 2015 and 2019 (Oyedeji, 2022).

Data by Statista (2022) indicate that the estimated population of Nigeria is 216.7 million in 2022. If the $5bn or $2bn public money stolen by Abacha or Dasuki is divided equally to all Nigerians, every Nigerian will own $23m or $9.3m. Even the lowest end of the $300m public money reported stolen by Ibori means every Nigeria is at least a million dollars rich. This amount is sufficient to establish a viable business and alludes to the fact that every Nigerian is (ought to be) rich but impoverished by political leaders in Nigeria.

d. Situation of health facilities in Nigeria

Recalling the statements of Nigerian medical practitioners that their emigration from Nigeria is instigated by lack of functional health facilities and equipment to work in Nigeria, a comparison of the cost of some health facilities in developed countries vis-à-vis the stolen public funds by Nigeria's political leaders indicates that Nigeria has sufficient money to conveniently establish functional health facilities that its medical practitioners crave abroad. For instance, the United Kingdom (UK) spent £1bn to rebuild St. Mary's Hospital in London and £162m to build a nine-storey hospital facility for the outpatients' wing of the hospital (Lydall, 2020). St. Mary's Hospital London could be considered the best hospital in the UK because it caters for the medical needs of Britain's monarch and UK's royal family.

The UK also established its Cancer Centre at Guy's Hospital in London at the cost of £160m (RSHP, 2020). Using the exchange rate as of 3 August 2022[1], the $5bn Nigeria's public funds stolen by Abacha is £4.1bn. The amount divided by the cost of UK's Cancer Center at Guy's Hospital could provide 25.6 similar hospitals in Nigeria or 25.3 of St. Mary's nine-storey hospitals for outpatients in Nigeria. Guy's and St. Mary's hospitals employ thousands of staff, cater for the health needs of thousands; and earn incomes that sustain them. Per the computation above, Nigeria could employ and cater for 20 times the number by both hospitals.

Consequent upon the lack of proper medical facilities in Nigeria, Nigerians spend $1.6bn annually on medical tourism – medical treatment abroad (Nnabuife, 2022) and most of those that can afford the luxury are political leaders and senior public officials. The cost of Nigeria's medical tourism can establish eight St. Mary's nine storey outpatients' hospitals and 8.1 Guy's Cancer Centers in Nigeria, even when we keep the labour costs constant. Considering the cost of medical treatment in the UK and the remuneration of Nigeria's political leaders and public officials, the source of the extra funds for the medical tourism is worth looking into in future studies. In the interim, Nigerians could ensure its leaders establish functional medical facilities by restricting the leaders' medical treatment to Nigeria only.

African political leaders and their families need to be concerned about the long-term effect of their political corruption and use their country's public funds to establish infrastructures that would benefit all in the long run. One good and recent reason is the global travel ban due to Covid-19 in 2020 since even the political leaders and their

[1] Retrieved from: https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=USD&To=GBP [Accessed on 3 August 2022]

families were prevented from travelling to developed countries for their usual medical care and luxurious tourism. At the time, like other citizens of their countries, the political leaders and their families had to put up with the dilapidated and unequipped healthcare infrastructures in their countries, which could have been improved if they had not stolen and laundered their countries' public funds.

e. Status of quality education in Nigeria

SDG 4 requires all Member States of the United Nations, incluiding Nigeria, to establish good infrastructures for quality education of its populace. The United Nations Educational, Scientifc and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2021a) defines education as "the process of facilitating learning or the acquisition of knowledge, skills, values, beliefs and habits" (p. 1) and quality education as "appropriate skills development, gender parity, provision of relevant school infrastructure, equipment, educational materials and resources, scholarships or teaching force" (p. 1).

Defining "quality education", the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF, 2000) stated that it encompasses:

- "Learners who are healthy, well-nourished and ready to participate and learn, and supported in learning by their families and communities.
- Environments that are healthy, safe, protective and gender-sensitive, and provide adequate resources and facilities.
- Content that is reflected in relevant curricula and materials for the acquisition of basic skills, especially in the areas of literacy, numeracy and skills for life, and knowledge in such areas as gender, health, nutrition, HIV/AIDS prevention and peace.

- Processes through which trained teachers use child-centred teaching approaches in well-managed classrooms and schools and skilful assessment to facilitate learning and reduce disparities.
- Outcomes that encompass knowledge, skills and attitudes, and are linked to national goals for education and positive participation in society."

President Nelson Mandela of South Africa (The Borgen Project, n.a.) recognised that:

> "Education is the great engine of personal development. It is through education that the daughter of a peasant can become a doctor, that the son of a mine worker can become the head of the mine, that a child of farm workers can become the president of a great nation. It is what we make out of what we have, not what we are given, that separates one person from another."

> "Young people must take it upon themselves to ensure that they receive the highest education possible so that they can represent us well in future as future leaders."

Contrary to President Mandela's viewpoint, which echo the standards set by UNESCO and UNICEF, Nigeria's political leaders send their children to industralised countries – UK, USA, Canada, etc. – for quality education (Opera News, 2021a; 2021b) but perpetually thwart efforts by the children of peasants to be educated, even in Nigeria. Jega (1995), a former president of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), advised that Nigeria's public universities are "grossly underfunded, understaffed, overcrowded and lacking in infrastructure and facilities" (p. 251) as well suffer incessant muzzling of ASUU and suppression of the rights of ASUU members. Confirming Jega's statement, Taiwo (2022) found that Nigeria's budgets from 2016

to 2022 were ₦6.06 trillion, ₦7.30 trillion, ₦9.2 trillion, ₦8.82 trillion, ₦10.51 trillion (Reuters, 2022b), ₦13.6 trillion (Reuters, 2022c) and ₦17.13 trillion respectively. The percentage of the annual budget earmarked for education of Nigerians between 2016 to 2022 was 7.9%, 6.1%, 7.1%, 8.4%, 6.5%, 5.7% and 5.4% respectively. Regardless of UNESCO's recommendation that education expenditure should be 15-20% of each country's annual budget and Nigeria's accent to the recommendation (Taiwo, 2022; UNESCO, 2021b), the percentage of Nigeria's budget for education has been below UNESCO's set limit since 2016.

Though Nigerian children and youths are willing to be educated, they are deprived of a safe environment and adequate proper educational facilities to learn. In 2014, about 276 female Christian students in Northern Nigeria were kidnapped from their school dormitories in Chibok by Boko Haram terrorists (Holpuch, 2018) and forced to change their religion to Islam in exchange for their lives. This birthed the campaign "#BringBackOurGirls", which was widely supported by the international communities and used as a political stick against President Goodluck Jonathan and carrot to usher in president General Muhammadu Buhari. Though President Buhari's election pledges included flaunting his military prowess to eradicate Boko Haram, the security situation worsened since he assumed office on 29 May 2015. As at 8 August 2022, near the completion of President Buhari's second-term four years in office, the security situation in the country had deteriorated. Fulani herdsmen armed with sophisticated weaponries have joined Boko Haram to unleash terror on Nigerians and slaughter unarmed Nigerians, under the watch of people from far and near. Between January and August 2021, over 1,000 students were abducted in Nigeria (Maishanu, 2021) and as at the time of writing this paper, a majority of the Chibok female students and other students subsequently captured from their schools by terrorists in Nigeria are yet to be found.

ASUU was founded in 1978 and it replaced Nigerian Association of University Teachers (NAUT), which was formed in 1965 (ASUU, n.a.). ASUU's goals are to engage Nigeria government to improve the conditions of service for ASUU's members; and contribute to Nigeria's socio-economic and political wellbeing (ASUU, n.a.). ASUU's first strike was in 1988 during the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. The government muzzled ASUU at the time when it proscribed ASUU, confiscated its assets, detained and tortured its then president and immediate past president – Drs Attahiru Jega and Festus Iyayi (ASUU, n.a.). Thereafter, ASUU's strikes became almost a yearly event, in addition to normal school breaks. Since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999, ASUU has embarked on 16 strike actions to decry their meagre remuneration, the lamentable teaching/learning conditions that Nigerian students are subjected to; and the deplorable state of Nigeria's political, economic and social state (Premium Times, 2022a; Tolu-Kolawole, 2022). During President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua's reign in 2009, the government and ASUU signed a memorandum of understanding – FG/ASUU 2009, to document Nigeria government's commitment to improve the remuneration of ASUU members and work conditions in Nigeria's public universities. Subsequent ASUU strikes have been geared on getting the government to fulfil the agreements enshrined in the memorandum. The duration of each ASUU strike since 1999 (BBC, 2022; Tolu-Kolawole, 2021) is detailed below:

Year	duration of ASUU strike	President at the time
1999	5 months	Obasanjo
2001	3 months	Obasanjo
2002	2 weeks	Obasanjo

2003	6 months	Obasanjo
2005	2 weeks	Obasanjo
2006	1 week	Obasanjo
2007	3 months	Obasanjo
2008	1 week	Yar'Adua
2009	4 months	Yar-Adua
2010	5 months	Jonathan
2011	2 month and 4 days	Jonathan
2013	5 months, 2 weeks and 1 day	Jonathan
2017	I month and 6 days	Buhari
2018	3 months	Buhari
2020	9 months	Buhari
2022	3 months and still ongoing	Buhari

Overall, ASUU's 16 strikes since 1999 cost Nigerian students over four academic years. Sixteen months and 6 days of the total duration of ASUU strikes happened under Buhari's regime (Haruna, et al., 2022) that ended on 29 May 2023. The current ASUU strike has been on for months. Due to the strikes, Nigerian students in public tertiary institutions spend extended years to graduate after unstructured staggered learning periods.

Consequent upon the lack of adequate functional infrastructures and facilities for education as well as the resultant recurring ASUU strikes, Nigerian children and youths

opt for education at exhorbitant price in industrialised countries. Nigerian students prefer the UK, USA and Canada for their tertiary education (Alagbe, 2022). Undergraduate degree in Economics and Management, a 3-year prigramme at Oxford University in the UK, costs £9,250 for UK nationals and $32,480 per annum for international students (University of Oxford, 2022), including Nigerians. The exchange rate of pounds sterling to naira as at the time of writing this paper was ₦504.61 (₦740 at the black market) to £1.[2] Hence, any Nigerian student that applies to study the Economics and Management degree at Oxford University is required to pay ₦49,169,198.80 for the programme. Undergraduate degree in Management at the University of Toronto cost $59,320 for international students, including Nigerians, and $6,100 for Canadians in 2022-2023 school year. Needless to state that most of the children of Nigeria's political leaders and top public officials undertake their tertiary studies abroad. Considering the remuneration of Nigeria's political leaders and public officials, one may wonder where they get the extra funds for the tuition from. In three months, between December 2021 and February 2022, Nigerians spent US$221million to study abroad (Alagbe, 2022).

A center for humanities at the university of Oxford, which includes a 500, 250 and 100 seater concert hall, theatre and black box laboratory respectively, cost £150m (Oxford Mail, 2021). A minute portion of the known amount of Nigeria's public funds stolen and laundered abroad by Nigeria's political leaders can pay for several of such buildings for education of Nigerian students in Nigeria.

[2] Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/search?q=exchange+rate+of+pounds+sterling+to+naira&rlz=1C1CSMH_enCH994CH994&oq=exchange+rate+of+pounds+sterling+&aqs=chrome.0.0i512j69i57j0i22i30l8.12018j1j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [Accessed on: 9 August 2022].

One way to ensure quality education for Nigerians is mandatory education of political leaders' children and close relatives in Nigerian tertiary institutions. The above could be included in the requisite requirements for vying for and remaining in a political/public office. Considering the tuition for education in developed countries vis-à-vis the remuneration of political leaders, a demand for accountability of the sources of the funds used to educate their children abroad could shed more light on political corruption in the country.

f. Functional peace and justice system

Insecurity in Nigeria is one main reason for emigration of its citizens from the country. Regardless of the public funds that Nigeria has reportedly spent to purchase weaponry (Premium Times, 2022c), killings by Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen in the North and kidnapping in the South remain a daily occurrence. Nigeria could benefit from functional internal intelligence and investigation institutions akin to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The 2020 budget for the FBI's employees was $9m and $51.9m for construction (Department of Justice, 2019). Nigeria can easily afford similar security standard like the FBI with a minute fraction of its known stolen and laundered public funds, assuming the laundered funds are returned and others are prevented from re-stealing and/or re-laundering the public funds. Whether the returned funds end up in the private pockets of the present political leaders is a topic for a separate study.

Emigration – global issues

Empirical studies on general emigration from West Africa posit that the same factors – poor infrastructures, unemployment/underemployment and low-income rate – that instigate emigration of skilled workers from the region also drive emigration of unskilled workers to seek greener pastures in industrialised countries (Antwi &

Nahanga, 2014; Abdu, et al., 2017). Overall, both groups are economic emigrants. While the recipient-countries are happy to receive the laundered stolen funds and skilled workers from underdeveloped countries, they are or become resentful of the migrants, particularly of the unskilled migrants, because provision of social services for the migrants drain their countries' budgets. Some recipient-countries resort to unspeakable degrading physical tortures and killings of (potential) migrants to keep them off their shores and budgets. On the other hand, (potential) migrants defy the hostilities that they are subjected to on their migration routes to developed economies (Channel TV, 2018; 2021).

Obviously, migration is a global problem as the influx of migrants stretch the resources at the receiving countries and resentment of migrants remains a hot-button political issue. Ms Kamala Harris, the incumbent Vice President of the United States, categorically told Guatemalans to 'not come to the US' (BBC, 2021). Italy, one of the main hubs for migrants to Europe, requested support from European Union (EU) countries - Germany, France and Malta - to continue their commitment to contain migration to Europe, including established collaboration with North African countries (Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Algeria) to curb migration through their space (Africanews, 2021). Though the migrants bring vibrancy and resuscitate dying rural towns in developed countries, including Italy (European Union, 2016) - Satriano, Bussana Vecchia, Civita di Bagnoregio, Riace and Calcata; and the Rust Belt city of Utica in New York (The New York Times, 2022); they are resented and killed by nationals of destination-countries (The Washington Post, 2018).

In 2015, the EU offered to pay $2 billion to African countries in an effort to keep their economic migrants at home (Kuo, 2015) and in March 2017 or thereabouts, the EU had a 'Migration Compact' with North African countries to contain migration from

Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Ethiopia (Abderrahim & Knoll, 2017). The effects of the Compact on the torture meted on West African migrants in North Africa on their migration to Europe is a study for another time. In or about October 2017, the EU was running out of funds to maintain its project of halting Nigerians and other Sub-Sahara Africans from migrating through North Africa (Rankin, 2017).

Methodology

Chapter 1- Research design and data collection

Research design

The researcher developed an original survey, which comprises eight questions, to collect data on (inclination to) emigration from underdeveloped countries, political corruption, and collective actions. The collected data were used to explore the impact of political corruption on emigration as well as how collective actions could contribute to the containment of political corruption, which in turn could curtail involuntary emigration.

The survey was administered and interviews were conducted with voluntary participants to elicit details of their inclination to emigrate from underdeveloped countries and the instigator(s) of their decision to emigrate; any impact that political corruption played in their emigration decision; and views on what and how collective actions by national and global communities could remediate the situation. The survey was more of convenience, as the cost of experimental study is high and beyond the researcher.

A correlational design method was used to ascertain any relationship between the variables.

Variables

Two variables – political corruption and emigration from underdeveloped countries to developed economies – were examined in this research. This paper posits that political corruption causes emigration. The premise for this position is encapsulated in the findings of the study as well as previous empirical studies, which evidenced that poverty and a lack of functional infrastructures instigate citizens of

underdeveloped countries to emigrate to developed countries. Put differently, the development infrastructures - better life conditions: security, more job opportunities with better pay, better facilities for healthcare, education, etc. – in developed countries attract citizens of underdeveloped countries to flee their countries of origin and relocate to developed countries. In other words, the decision to emigrate from underdeveloped countries to developed countries revolves around access to development infrastructures. This deduction corroborates Lee's (1966) push-pull theory of migration, which postulates that emigration is instigated by negative and positive conditions at the locations of origin and destination respectively; and Ravenstein's (1885) laws of migration that people in rural areas (underdeveloped countries) are more migratory, and that economic conditions are the main reasons for migration.

While some emigrants may relocate to unite with their families in developed countries, the root cause of the emigration decision by the original family member that emigrated to and chose to remain in the developed countries could be connected to access to development infrastructures. Majority of the respondents in this study confirm that they will happily return to their country of origin if their country has similar infrastructures like developed countries.

There is preponderant previous empirical evidence, as also found in this study, that most underdeveloped countries have enormous natural resources that earn them billions of United States dollars but they remain underdeveloped while countries with little or no natural resources are industrialised/developed. It is the paradox of plenty/poverty described by Auty (1994) as resources curse. While the study by Auty indicates that a lack of visible outcomes from the incomes earned from natural resources results from mismanagement of the initial boom and subsequent shrink in

natural resources, this paper posits that the resources curse is political corruption with its consequential underdevelopment and poverty, which further leads to involuntary emigration. The public funds that could have been used to establish similar development infrastructures in currently underdeveloped countries are swallowed up in political corruption, as political leaders in underdeveloped countries steal and launder their countries' public funds for their private use. This paper hypothesizes that political corruption instigates emigration by depriving citizens of underdeveloped countries the development infrastructures that attract them to emigrate to developed countries.

Consequently, political corruption is treated as an independent variable, that is as a (contributory) cause of emigration. Emigration, as the recipient of the (potential) impact of political corruption, is the dependent variable. Examination of political corruption as the independent variable also encompassed other potential causes of underdevelopment - poverty, insecurity, poor facilities for healthcare and education. The additional factors above were included in the examination because they are parts of the symptoms of underdevelopment and could also be caused by political corruption and may lead to emigration.

Supranational collective action was not examined as a variable but as a possible solution to contain political corruption and involuntary emigration.

Participants

One hundred and fifty-four Nigerian adults accessed the materials in this study. A total of 147 of them accessed the survey and seven participated in a one-on-one interview session conducted by the researcher. However, 12 of the 147 did not

respond to any of the questions. Thus, they are excluded from the analysis of the collected data for this study. One hundred and thirty-five of the 147 participants answered most of the survey questions. In all, there are 142 participants in this study.

Selection of survey participants

The researcher prepared the following message and sent it with the anonymous link to potential participants via various WhatsApp, Messenger and Facebook groups comprising Nigerians at home and in diaspora. The research sample is more of convenience than probability due to the cost implications of assembling the latter. However, the sample for the interview would help to reduce any biases by the survey sample.

> Dear fellow Nigerians,
>
> I am conducting research on the impact of political corruption on emigration from Nigeria and how international community could collectively take action to curtail the root cause. The migration element does NOT include short visits abroad for holiday, tourism, conferences, etc. My research is solely for academic purpose.
>
> The questionnaire is anonymous and takes about 5 minutes to complete. Participation is voluntary, but I pray you respond to my questionnaire and help make Nigeria a better country for us all.
>
> Thank you in advance.

Interview participants

The researcher prepared a shorter version of the above message with five interview questions and sent it to 13 potential participants, individually on WhatsApp. The

participants for the interview are Nigerians living in developed countries. The message is reproduced in the 'instrument' section below.

Of the 13 potential interviewees contacted for the study, 10 indicated their willingness to participate and three did not respond to the message. Of the 10 who agreed, seven eventually participated. The remaining three were unavailable, the interview could not be postponed indefinitely due to time constraints to submit this paper.

Overall, all the potential participants for both the survey and interview were informed of the purpose, anonymity, voluntariness, estimated completion time of the survey questions and confidentiality of the interviewees for this study.

To include Nigerians who had no access to internet, seven organisations - Caritas International, CARE International, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), Oxfam International, International Rescue Committee, International Committee of the Red Cross, and the European Union - that usually support (potential) emigrants, were contacted for access to conduct an anonymous interview with any (potential) emigrants in their care who was willing to participate in the research. They were advised that the collected data would be protected in accordance with requirements of applicable laws in the participants' countries of origin (Nigeria) and residence. To assure the anonymity of the participants, the organisations were requested to provide their organisation's official telephone number(s) for the interview with the (potential) emigrants in their care. Only two of them responded and they advised that they did not work with Nigerian emigrants. Consequently, this avenue could not be explored.

Instrument

1. Primary data

a. Survey

An anonymous semi-structured open-ended questionnaire, was developed and created on Qualtrics - a web-based software for creation and administration of surveys and generation of related reports - by the researcher. An anonymous survey link was automatically created by Qualtrics, and this was the survey link that was shared to potential participants by the researcher. Responses to the anonymous survey were automatically collected, recorded and stored by Qualtrics. There was no requirement for inclusion of identifying particulars in the survey. Though the researcher could view the completed and in-progress responses to the survey, they had no identifying information of the participants.

The survey was in three parts and in the following order: introduction, survey questions, and demographics. The first section contained a letter/message, akin to the message that was sent with the survey link to the WhatsApp groups, which is reproduced above and in appendix 1 to this paper. Overall, the researcher introduced herself and advised the potential participants that the survey was solely for academic purpose, that their participation was anonymous, confidential and their responses would be protected in accordance with applicable laws in the relevant jurisdictions.

The second section contained 10 semi-structured open-ended questions with a dropdown of possible answers and an option for participants to write their own response, without necessarily choosing from the dropdown list. The survey report

generated by Qualtrics includes the 10 survey questions that are reproduced below and is annexed to this paper.

1. When given the opportunity, would you like to travel and live abroad? Or are you already living outside Nigeria?

2. Which country would you like to relocate to/live in outside Nigeria? [the dropdown list included the US, UK, Canada, Australia and five common destination-countries for Nigerians in Europe – Italy, Spain, Greece, France, Germany. There was also an option for "Other" - for countries not covered above).

3. Why would you like to travel and live abroad? OR why did you leave Nigeria to live abroad?

4. On a scale from 1 to 10 (with 1 being the highest, very corrupt) how corrupt is Nigeria?

5. Compared to corruption in Nigeria, how corrupt are the following countries (US, UK, Italy, Spain, Greece, France, Germany and Australia) on a scale from 1 to 10 (with 1 being the highest)?

6. Why do you think Nigeria lacks the kind of infrastructures found in countries like the US, Canada, UK, Italy, Spain, Greece, France, Germany and Australia?

7. How do you think corrupt Nigeria's political leaders and government officials spend the money that they take abroad from Nigeria?

8. Do you think the regular salaries/incomes paid to political leaders and other government officials are enough for the kind of houses, vehicles and holidays that they have in Nigeria or abroad?

9. How do you think countries abroad and international communities can help stop political corruption in your country?

10. How do you think Nigerians can help stop political corruption in Nigeria?

Questions 1, 2, and 3 were designed to examine the participants' inclination towards emigration from Nigeria. Hence, they cover the required data to explore the emigration variable in this study.

Questions 4 and 5, which were primarily aimed to elicit the participants' corruption perception of Nigeria and the industrialised countries did not produce useable data because a glider was included for participants to slide to their desired response/rating. However, it did not work out well as the glider seemed difficult to use to record the participants' rating. Consequently, both questions are excluded from the analysis in this paper. Notwithstanding the above, the participants' perception of the extent of corruption in Nigeria is also deducible from **questions 6, 7 and 8**, which were designed to collect data on political corruption.

Questions 9 and 10 were designed to collect data on collective actions at both supranational and national levels.

The third section of the survey was for demographic data – gender, age, and educational level. The gender criterion was divided into female, male and "prefer not to say"; and the age element was grouped in three divisions – 18-35 years, 36-55 years, and 56 and above. The educational level criterion had five sub-sets – primary, vocational training/trade, secondary/high school, university first degree, and post-graduate degree.

Overall, the survey questions were aimed to elicit data regarding the participants' willingness and purpose for travelling to developed countries (Europe, North America and Australia); their preferred destination-country/region for migration; their educational and employment status; their knowledge of political corruption in their

country of origin and its effects on their decision to travel abroad; and how international collective action could contain political corruption, which in turn could contain emigration.

b. **Interview**

Five interview questions, carved from the 10 survey questions above, were discussed in separate confidential interview with the seven participants, who are Nigerians presently residing in developed countries, who showed up for the discussion. The interview questions with a message sent to all the potential participants/interviewees is reproduced below:

> Dear XXX
>
> I am doing research on how political corruption impacts migration. The research is supervised by Prof. (Emeritus) Michael Johnston.
>
> I would appreciate it if you would participate in about 10mins audio recorded, anonymous and confidential interview to share your thoughts.
>
> Our discussion will focus on the following questions:
>
> 1. Why did you relocate from Nigeria?
>
> 2. Why do you think Nigeria has no (adequate) functional infrastructures like industrialised countries?
>
> 3. How does corruption by Nigeria's political leaders impact Nigeria's capabilities?
>
> 4. If Nigeria has similar functional infrastructures as in your current country of residence, will you return home? Why?

5. What is your highest level of education?

There is no right or wrong answer, you only need to share your thoughts during our discussion. We can have the discussion at your convenience any time/day this week.

Thank you in advance for your participation.

Considering the open-endedness of the interview questions, it elicited the free narration of the interviewees, which birthed follow-up questions. It was a discussion between the interviewer and each interviewee.

2. Secondary data

a. Data on political corruption in Nigeria

Direct evidence is extremely scarce on political corruption because of its secretiveness and the calibre of those involved. Majority of available direct evidence is gathered by law enforcement agents during authorised investigation. Parts of the collected evidence that are published by law enforcers or other public records form the body of secondary data on political corruption relied on in this paper.

The data on political corruption published by the EFCC on its website - https://www.efcc.gov.ng/; Premium Times - https://www.premiumtimesng.com/ - the main newspaper that focuses on political corruption in Nigeria; the Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) Initiative - https://star.worldbank.org/asset-recovery-watch-database, which is managed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Bank; and the US Department of Justice - https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/enforcement-actions are the sources of the secondary data on political corruption relied on in this paper.

b. Data on emigration from Nigeria

In addition to the primary data gathered from participants in this research, secondary data on emigration from Nigeria were also collected from the public records on the websites of the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Global Commission on International Migration, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Chapter 2- Data Analysis of collected data

Summary of collected data

One hundred and forty-seven Nigerian adults at home and in diaspora accessed the survey for this research. Twelve of them did not respond to any of the questions. Thus, they are excluded from the analysis of the collected data. The remaining 135 participants that responded to the survey either live abroad or would like to emigrate if the opportunity surfaces. Seven respondents participated in a one-on-one interview with the researcher, and they all live in developed countries. Some of the respondents partially responded to some questions. Overall, data was collected from 142 participants for this research.

1. Survey data

For the survey, all the questions were semi-structured and open-ended with possible multiple responses. It also allowed opportunity for participants to include their views, if they were not covered in the list of possible responses for each question. Only questions 1 and 8 were direct and required a 'Yes' and 'No' response. 10 possible responses were listed for question 2; 12 for question 3; question 6 had 3 options; question 7 had 7 options; questions 9 and 10 had 6 possible responses each. One or more responses from the list of multiple choices or participants' addition of their own response, which was not on the multiple choice list the response, was considered as a complete response.

The details of the demographics of the respondents are as below.

Though the blank responses for the demographics were not captured in the report generated by Qualtrics and reproduced in this section, they were manually computed as 20 of the 135 respondents for gender; 19 for age groups; and 18 for education

level. For gender criterion, the blank responses were merged with the 2 respondents that “prefer not to say” their gender and totalled to 22.



#	Field		Choice Count
1	Male	62.39%	73
2	Female	35.90%	42
3	Prefer not to say	1.71%	2
			117

Demographics – Gender of respondents

Responses by female respondents

There are 42 female respondents that participated in this study. Thirty-nine of them responded to question 1 regarding inclination towards emigration from Nigeria. Thirty-four (87%) of the 39 stated that they are inclined to emigration. Twelve of the 42 are in age group 18-35; 25 in age group 36-55; and 5 in age group 56 and above. Concerning their levels of education, 4 of them have secondary school certificates; 18 have first degrees and 20 have post-graduate degrees.

All the 12 respondents aged 18-35 indicated that they are receptive to emigration except one that did not respond to the question. They all also responded in favour of

prevalent political corruption in Nigeria (questions 6 and 7). However, four of the 12 believe that the legal incomes of Nigeria political leaders are sufficient for their extravagant lifestyle.

Of the 25 respondents aged 36-55 years, three would rather remain in Nigeria and three were silent on the question; the above 6 did not also respond to subsequent questions on emigration – questions 2 and 3. The remaining 19 stated that they were in favour of emigration from Nigeria.

In their response to survey questions 6, 7 and 8, all the 25 respondents affirmed that Nigeria suffers from political corruption, except one that chose to be silent on questions 6 and 7; two of them chose not to respond to question 8; and five of them believe that the legal incomes of Nigeria's political leaders are enough to afford the luxuries that they display.

Four of the five respondents aged 56 and above were receptive to emigration and the remaining one preferred to remain in Nigeria. The one above and two others were silent on questions 2 and 3 regarding emigration. All of them believe that Nigeria political leaders are corrupt.

All forty-two female respondents believe that global and national collective actions are vital for remediation of political corruption, which would in turn curtail emigration problems (questions 9 and 10).

Responses by male respondents

Seventy-three male respondents participated in this study. Sixteen of them are aged 18-35; forty-six of them are 36-55 years old; and eleven of them are aged 56 years

and above. One of them attained primary education; three attained secondary education; one has vocation/trade; thirty-nine of them have first degrees; and twenty-nine have post-graduate degrees. Eighty-eight percent of the 73 male respondents indicated they are receptive to emigration while the remaining 12% are against emigration.

Alignment of results of demographics with previous studies

It is noteworthy that the 28 (12 females and 16 males) respondents in the youngest age group in this study indicated that they are receptive to emigration and only one (6%) of the males stated he would like to return home after tourism in Australia. Hence, 94% of the males aged 18-35 indicated their propensity to emigration. Of the 46 males in age group 36-55 years, 41 (89%) indicated their reception to emigration. Of the 11 males aged 56 and above, 7 (64%) of them affirmed their inclination to emigration.

The above confirms the findings in previous empirical studies that young males are more likely to emigrate than their older counterparts (Pursell, 1977; Argent & Walmsley, 2008; Manning & Trimmer, 2013). If and why older migrants may (not) plan to bring their family members to their destination-countries is a study for another time, as they are not captured in the current data. It should be borne in mind that the sample for this research is mainly for convenience.

Responses per educational level

One hundred and seventeen respondents indicated their educational levels. Fifty-eight of them have university first degrees; 50 have post-graduate degrees; seven attained secondary education; one each has primary school education and a vocation/trade respectively.



#	Field		Choice Count
1	Primary school	0.85%	1
2	Vocational training/trade	0.85%	1
3	Secondary school	5.98%	7
4	First degree/equivalent	49.57%	58
5	Post-graduate degree	42.74%	50
			117

Demographics – Educational level of respondents

In their response to question 1, all 58 first degree holders are open to emigration except three that would stay in Nigeria and two others who chose to remain silent. The above five respondents and one other opted to be quiet on questions 2 and 3.

For question 6, all the respondents believe that Nigeria political leaders are corrupt except two who chose to be quiet on the matter. Three also decided to be silent on question 7 and one did likewise for question 8. Seventeen others believe that the legal incomes of Nigeria political leaders are sufficient for their extravagant lifestyle. The

remaining respondents believe that the political leaders are corrupt and steal Nigeria's public funds to enjoy/maintain their luxuries. All but one each for questions 9 and 10 believe that supranational and national collective actions are useful to curb political corruption and its consequential triple on emigration from Nigeria.

Apart from 9 of the 50 post-graduates who are against emigration from Nigeria and one who preferred to be silent on the subject, others affirmed their inclination to emigration. For the follow-up questions on emigration (questions 2 and 3), twelve of the 50 respondents opted to be quiet. Otherwise, the rest affirmed their openness to emigration from Nigeria. For questions 6-8 on political corruption, one respondent each was silent on the three questions. In response to question 6, one other stated that political leaders were not corrupt. Five of the 50 respondents also believe that the legal incomes of political leaders are sufficient for their ostentatious way of life. The remaining 45 respondents stated that political leaders are corrupt. One each indicated that global and national collective actions are unnecessary to curtail political corruption or its resultant effect on migration. The remaining forty-nine in each case stated that national and supranational collective actions are required for containment of political corruption and emigration problems.

All 7 respondents with secondary school education are receptive to emigration; believe that political leaders are corrupt, per their responses to questions 6 and 7; and that global and national collective actions are paramount to surmount the problems of political corruption and the associated problems of emigration. However, two of them believe that the legal incomes of political leaders are sufficient for their elaborate living, per their responses to question 8.

The one respondent with primary school education and one for vocation/trade group are in favour of emigration and collective action at both global and national levels. They both believe that the legal incomes of political leaders match their grandiose lifestyle. However, the respondent with primary school education was silent on questions 6 and 7 regarding political corruption while the vocation/trade respondent believes Nigeria's political leaders are corrupt.

Overall, 108 of the 117 respondents that indicated their educational level are university graduates. Ninety-six (89%) of the 108 indicated they have either emigrated from Nigeria or have inclination to do so when the opportunity surfaces. Hence, twelve (11%) of the 108 are willing to remain in Nigeria.

While the above data were collected from a convenience sample, which probably explains why there are more graduates in the sample, it is worth noting that the graduates-respondents had the option to indicate their preference to not emigrate. Their overwhelming affirmation for emigration corroborates previous empirical findings regarding the continuous outflow/brain drain of educated Nigerians, including medical personnel (Odekunle, 2012; Anetoh & Onwudinjo, 2020), as discussed in previous sections of this paper. These data should worry Nigeria government and the proponents of global development because the continuous emigration of educated citizens from one developing country, that is nose-deep in political corruption, is tantamount to exit of those that could challenge corrupt officials and proffer solutions to remediate the situation.

The international community should also be worried about the because the continuous emigration of educated citizens from developing data countries with the consequential absence of capabilities to establish anti-corruption measures and

institutions for development signifies failure to achieve the SDGs and global development.

Demographics – Age

Overall, the respondents were spread across three age groups – 18-35, 36-55, and 56 and above. Per the survey report reproduced below, age group 36-55 years had 62% of the total respondents with 72 out of 116. Age group 18-35 was next with 28 respondents; and there were 16 respondents in age group 56 and above.



#	Field		Choice Count
1	18 - 35 years old	24.14%	28
2	36-55 years	62.07%	72
3	56 and above	13.79%	16
			116

Responses per those that omitted one or more of their demographics

Prefer not to say/blank: There were 20 respondents who chose the option "prefer not to say" or left the response space blank. Two of them are in age groups 36-55 and 56 and above and their highest education level are first and post-graduate degrees

respectively. Another respondent has a post-graduate degree. The remaining 17 did not add any demographic details.

The collected data were also analysed per the participants' response to the questions set for each variable – questions 1-3 for emigration; 6-8 for political corruption; and 9-10 for collective action.

Data on emigration

Question 1: When given the opportunity, would you like to travel and live abroad? Or are you already living outside Nigeria?

Q1 - When given the opportunity, would you like to travel and live abroad? Or are you already living outside Nigeria?



#	Field	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std Deviation	Variance	Count
1	When given the opportunity, would you like to travel and live abroad? Or are you already living outside Nigeria?	1.00	2.00	1.14	0.35	0.12	132

#	Field		Choice Count
1	Yes	85.61%	113
2	No	14.39%	19
			132

Three participants did not answer this question. Thus, 132 participants responded to this question. Nineteen (14.39%) of them stated that they do not want to live abroad and 113 (85.61%) affirmed that they either live or would like to emigrate abroad.

Question 2: Which country would you like to relocate to/live in outside Nigeria? (a list of possible migration destination included the US. UK, Canada, Italy, Spain, Greece, Germany, France, Australia and "other" for countries of participants' choice outside the list).

As tabulated below, 110 participants responded with 136 responses to this question. Ninety-six participants indicated only one country as their preferred destination and 14 chose multiple countries.

One destination-country										
Country	Canada	US	UK	Australia	Germany	**Other**	**Total**			
No. of (potential) migrants	46	23	17	2	1	7	96			
Multiple destination-country										**Total**
UK/ Canada	US/ Canada	US/Canada/ Australia	US/Canada/ Australia/ Other	US/Other	US/UK	US/UK/ Canada	US/UK/ Canada/ Australia	US/UK/ Canada/ France	US/UK/ Canada/ Italy/ Germany	
2	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	14

The single-choice (potential) destination-country included 46 for Canada; 23 for US; 17 for UK; 2 for Australia; 1 for Germany and 7 for other unspecified country(ies). With inclusion of the multiple destination-country choices, 58 (42.65%) of the total 136 responses preferred Canada; 35 (24.74%) the US; 25 (18.38%) the UK; 1 (0.74%)

each for Italy and France; 2 (1.4%) for Germany; 5 (3.68%) for Australia; and 9 (6.62%) for other locations outside the above countries; and zero for Spain and Greece.

The demographics for the responses for single destination-country were examined for Canada, US and UK, the three countries with the highest responses. A record of the complete data for all the countries studied is annexed to this paper. For Canada, there were 11 females, 29 males, 6 did not state their gender. Their age groups are 18-35 years (14 respondents), 36-55 years (25 respondents); and 56 and above years (2 respondents); and 5 respondents did not state their age group(s). For their educational levels, 25 respondents have first degrees, 12 possess post-graduate degrees, 3 and 1 respondents have secondary/high school and primary certificates respectively, and 5 did not include the details.

The demographics data were provided by 20 of the 23 respondents who indicated their inclination to emigrate to the US. The remaining 3 did not provide any demographic details. The 20 respondents included 12 males and 8 females with 3 of them aged 18-35 years; 14 of them aged 36-55 years; and 3 aged 56 years and above. The educational level of the 20 respondents are 10 first degree holders, 8 post-graduates, and 2 secondary/high school certificate holders.

The responses for UK indicated that there are 6 females, 7 males and 4 that did not/prefer not to say. Their age groups are 18-35 (4 respondents); 36-55 (8 respondents); 56 and above (1 respondent); and 4 did not say/prefer not to say; and their educational level included 10 with first degrees, 4 with post-graduate degrees and 3 that did not say or prefer not to say.

Question 3: Why would you like to travel and live abroad? Or Why did you leave Nigeria to live abroad?

1	A better economic opportunities (absence/reduced poverty, better employment and salary) for myself and/or my family	12.67%	57
2	Better security and safety	15.11%	68
3	Better health facilities	11.56%	52
4	Cleaner environment and water	8.44%	38
5	Better educational opportunities	13.11%	59
6	Better roads and transportation facilities	9.11%	41
7	Reliable justice system	10.44%	47
8	Less corruption	10.22%	46
9	. I would like to reunite with my family in the country that I selected above	4.00%	18
10	I would like to study abroad and return to Nigeria	2.67%	12
11	I would like to just visit countries abroad to learn more about them and their ways of life, and return to Nigeria	2.67%	12
			450


A better economic opportunities (absence/reduced poverty, better employment and salary) for myself and/or my family
Better security and safety
Better health facilities
Cleaner environment and water
Better educational opportunities
Better roads and transportation facilities
Reliable justice system
Less corruption
. I would like to reunite with my family in the country that I selected above
I would like to study abroad and return to Nigeria
I would like to just visit countries abroad to learn more about them and their ways of life, and return to Nigeria
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70

Q3_12_TEXT - None of the above (please state your response below)

None of the above (please state your response below)
Better opportunities to live a fulfilled life
Better economic opportunities
Job requirements
No 1,8 and 11
Better opportunities, head way for the kids
Better clime fir opportunities
Work related posting

Per the results above, 450 responses were received for question 3. Manual analysis of the collected data indicated that 103 participants responded to the question.

Security was the commonest reason that the participants provided for their reception to emigration from Nigeria. This was followed by better educational opportunities, health facilities, reliable justice system and less corruption. Twelve (2.6%) out of the 450 responses indicated that they would like to study abroad and return to Nigeria. A similar number would like to visit and return to Nigeria. However, they all, except

two of them, also stated that they would emigrate from Nigeria because of several other factors. Only two of the 12 stated that the sole reason for their emigration is tourism - to visit and return; to unite with their family, and study and return. These two were excluded from potential long-term emigrants due to political corruption and other factors. Hence 101 (98.1%) participants indicated that they would rather relocate from Nigeria and live abroad because of the lack of development infrastructures in Nigeria.

2. Political corruption

Question 6: Why do you think Nigeria lacks the kind of infrastructure found in countries like the US, Canada, the UK, Italy, Spain, Greece, France, Germany and Australia?

The default result generated on Qualtrics, which is reproduced below, indicates that there are 118 responses to this question. One hundred and eight of the responses indicated that Nigeria has natural resources but remains poor because of political corruption; 8 responses indicate that there are other reasons for the lack of development infrastructures in Nigeria, including that developed countries want Nigeria and other underdeveloped countries to remain underdeveloped; and the remaining two believe that Nigeria is poor because it has no natural resources or other known sources of income to acquire development infrastructures. Available evidence, as discussed in previous sections in this paper, contradicts the belief that Nigeria is poor or lacks natural resources.

A manual review of the result revealed that the 118 responses were entered by 116 respondents. Two of the 116 respondents selected other responses that Nigeria has natural responses and none of the above option and added that the examined state of Nigeria is a result of “poor leadership cum followership” and “Nigeria is not poor,

Nigeria is extremely rich in minerals and natural resources. Our leaders are not our problem, we are our own problem. We prefer fast and immediate money to our future, that's [sic] because young adults take money from our ancestors and vote them into power then keep complaining. We are very comfortable with being uncomfortable. We prefer stomach infrastructure. If you are [sic] not ready to share money in this country then you have failed your people, infrastructure is secondary." The respondents' additional comments support the view that Nigeria has natural resources. The two responses are added to the 108 responses.

The additional 6 responses under "None of the above" option added their reasons for the status of Nigeria as: 1.) Nigeria is not developed because of corruption, lack political will and insensitivity of the government officials; 2.) Corruption; 3.) Greed and small mindedness of the leaders; 4.) A lack to harness the natural resources in underdeveloped countries, boost the institutions, and requisite political will: 5.) Developed countries want underdeveloped countries to remain underdeveloped; and 6.) Prolonged mismanagement of Nigeria's natural resources. The context of the above 6 responses depicts their alignment with the viewpoint that Nigeria has natural resources but is impoverished by its political leaders. Thus the 6 responses are added to the responses by the 110 responses, this brings the total for this category to 116. Consequently, the results of collected data for this question equal: 116 (98%) for Nigeria has natural resources but is impoverished; and 2 responses by two participants (2%) that Nigeria has no natural resources.

Q6 - Why do you think Nigeria lacks the kind of infrastructure found in countries like the US, Canada, the UK, Italy, Spain, Greece, France, Germany and Australia?

1	Nigeria is poor because it has no natural resources or other known means of income to acquire the infrastructures	1.69%	2
2	Nigeria has natural resources but it is still poor because political leaders and government officials take the money for themselves and their associates	91.53%	108
3	None of the above.(please state your response below)	6.78%	8
			118

Q6_3_TEXT - None of the above.(please state your response below)

None of the above.(please state your response below) - Text

Corruption

We are yet to harness our resources, firm up our institutions and develop and display the requisite political will

Greed and small mindedness of leader which has affected the people now.

Nigeria is not poor, Nigeria is infact extremely rich in minerals and natural resources. Our leaders are not our problem, we are our own problem. We prefer fast n immediate money to our future, thatâ€™s why young adults take money from our ancestors n vote them into power..then keep complaining. We are very comfortable with being uncomfortable. We prefer stomach infrastructure. If youâ€™re not ready to share money in this country then you have failed your people ..infrastructure is secondary.

Poor leadership cum followership

Nigeria is not developed because of corruption and lack political will and insensitivity of the government officials

Developed world want them that way!

Nigeria lacks infrastructure but blessed with natural resources which have been mismanaged over the years. Corruption has made it difficult for the country to benefit from the natural resources

In effect, it seems that political corruption intertwines with other related factors, particularly underdevelopment indicators – poverty, insecurity, lack of access to quality education and healthcare – to contribute to emigration from developing countries to developed countries. It could also be argued that if the public funds were not stolen by political leaders, the funds could have been used to establish functional security, educational, health and other services. The availability of these services

would in turn reduce emigration from developing countries to developed countries; contribute to the development of the developing countries, which would in turn contribute to global development and achievement of the SDGs.

Question 7: How do you think Nigeria's political leaders and government officials spend the money that they take abroad from Nigeria?

The results of the responses to question 7 is reproduced below. 114 participants responded and provided 409 responses to the question. Two of the respondents repeated an answer to question 6 – "Nigeria has natural resources, but it is still poor because political leaders and government officials take the money for themselves and their associates". The two responses were excluded from the analysis of question 7, which leaves the number of respondents to the question at 112. All the 112 (100%) respondents agreed that Nigeria's political/public officials do steal public funds for their personal use.

Q7 - How do you think corrupt Nigeria's political leaders and government officials spend the money that they take abroad from Nigeria?

Q7_7_TEXT - None of the above (please state your response below)

None of the above (please state your response below)
They stash money abroad for security.. expecting the worst for Nigeria then they can escape..
All of the above
None of the above (please state your response below)
They enjoy themselves the Nigerian way. We like them like that.
All of the above
Keep them in banks abroad and secure a place to run to just incase
All of the above
All of the above
All of the above
All of the above

1	They buy houses and expensive vehicles abroad	23.72%	97
2	They enjoy good holidays in expensive hotels/resorts abroad	18.09%	74
3	They go abroad for medical treatment	17.85%	73
4	They send their children to good/expensive schools abroad	20.54%	84
5	They enjoy similar facilities in good/expensive places at home	9.05%	37
6	They hide the money in air-conditioned vacant buildings	10.76%	44
			409

Three hundred and twenty-eight (80%) of the 409 responses indicated that public funds stolen by Nigeria's political leaders and public officials are laundered and used abroad in the following order: 1.) Purchase houses and expensive vehicles; 2.) Send their children to good and expensive schools abroad; 3.) Enjoy good holidays in expensive holidays/resorts abroad; and 4.) Go for medical tourism abroad.

Eighty-one (19.81%) of the 409 responses indicated that political leaders/public officials also hide stolen public funds in Nigeria in the following order 1.) Hiding the stolen funds in air-conditioned vacant buildings (10.76%); and 2.) Good facilities in expensive places in Nigeria (9.05%).

There are 9 comments by those who selected "none of the above" option. Six of the additional comments stated their agreement with the list of possible responses and the remaining 3 comments regarding possible ways that Nigeria's political leaders and public officials spend the funds that they steal from Nigeria's public funds are: 1.) They stash money abroad for security, expecting the worst for Nigeria then they can escape; 2.) They enjoy themselves the Nigerian way. We like them like that; and 3.) Keep them in banks abroad and secure a place to run to just in case.

Question 8: Do you think the regular salaries/incomes paid to political leaders and other government officials are enough for the kind of houses, vehicles, and holidays that they have in Nigeria and abroad?

One hundred and fifteen participants provided a Yes/No answer to the question. Two added that Nigeria's politicians/public officials use the country's public funds for their private gains; 25 participants believe that the remunerations of the politicians/public officials are sufficient for them to buy the luxury houses, vehicles and expensive holidays that they enjoy in Nigeria and abroad.



#	Field	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std Deviation	Variance
1	Do you think the regular salaries/incomes paid to political leaders and other government officials are enough for the kind of houses, vehicles, and holidays that they have in Nigeria and abroad?	1.00	2.00	1.22	0.41	0.17

#	Field		Choice Count
1	No	78.26%	90
2	Yes	21.74%	25
			115

3. Collective actions – Supranational efforts

Question 9: How do you think countries abroad and international communities can help to stop political corruption in your country?

One hundred and seventeen participants responded to this question. One hundred and ten of the 117 respondents agreed with one or more of the listed possible ways for supranational efforts to combat political corruption. Eighty-one of the 110 respondents chose more than one response from the list of possible responses and 29 of the 110 respondents chose only one of response from the list.

Six of the 110 respondents added their comments on possible additional ways for global collective actions to curb corruption, as reproduced below in items h-m. Seven of the 117 respondents chose the option of "other" and added their own possible measures and their views are listed in items a - g below. Two of the seven (items b and d) respondents believe that supranational collective actions are unnecessary to contain political corruption in Nigeria. Apart from this two, the remaining 5 of the 7 respondents are added to the 110 to make 115. Hence 115 (98.29%) out of 117 respondents agreed on the necessity of global efforts to curtail political corruption while 2 (1.71%) dissented.

Q9 - How do you think countries abroad and international communities can help stop political corruption in your country?

1	Countries abroad and their banks should not accept money (that exceed the normal salary/income of politicians) from Nigeria's political leaders	22.08%	85
2	They should return to Nigeria all the moneys that Nigeria's political leaders and other government officials brought to their countries	18.70%	72
3	They should publish every money sent to their countries by Nigeria's political leaders and other government officials	19.48%	75
4	Countries abroad should record all moneys they receive from Nigerians in the real names of the owners of the money	17.40%	67
5	The countries abroad should contribute to global anti-corruption awareness education in Nigeria	18.96%	73
6	Other measures (please specify below)	3.38%	13
			385

Q9_6_TEXT - Other measures (please specify below)

a. They should publish all the record of their wealth abroad on CCN on a monthly bases

b. It is not the work of other countries to help Nigeria

c. 3 and 4

d. Most developed countries, though with high tech infrastructure are more corrupt than Nigeria, donâ€™t get it twisted. Nigeriaâ€™s learning where they are..itâ€™s just that they are more technologically advanced. Most wars in the Middle East n around the world have political undertone with economic benefits when 1st world countries choose to take sides n involve themselves. Know this n know peace, Nigeria is good..our politicians just like to enjoy..thatâ€™s all.

e. All of the above

f. Arrest and charge them accordingly for money laundering

g. By keeping out of the country's economy matters

h. Countries abroad should make laws against Nigeria's politicians and cronies who bring monies to their countries that they would be jailed along with their families on completion of their tenures in office in Nigeria for not less than 30yrs.

i. All of the above see

j. Use the money in Nigeria to build infrastructure.

k. The countries abroad should reject the corrupt Nigerian from using their country as safe haven for escaping prosecution

l. All of the above. Corrupt politicians and other top government officials should be named, shamed and prosecuted to serve as deterrence to others

m. By reporting inflows beyond a certain amount

Developed countries stimulate and benefit from emigration from underdeveloped countries by accepting stolen public funds from corrupt political leaders of underdeveloped countries; and when citizens of underdeveloped countries emigrate to developed countries, they are resented by citizens of developed countries and exploited via cheap labour. This is the paradox of the poor; they are exploited by the rich. Developed countries have the technological prowess to detect corrupt proceeds laundered through their banks and financial institutions. However, they turn blind eyes because the corrupt proceeds boost their economy, at the detriment of underdeveloped countries.

Per the result generated on Qualtrics, which is reproduced above, 117 respondents provided 385 responses to question 9. With 85 (22.08%) responses, a call for countries abroad and their financial institutions to refuse laundered stolen public funds from other countries, particularly Nigeria and other underdeveloped countries, is the top-ranked global collective action measure to contain political corruption. This was followed closely by a 75% call on countries abroad to publish all funds sent to their countries by political leaders and government officials of other countries, particularly Nigeria and other underdeveloped countries; and 73% call for global anti-corruption awareness education. A 72% response rate called for return of all laundered stolen public funds to their original country-owner, including Nigeria and other underdeveloped countries; and a 63% call for transparent accounting systems – countries abroad to record in the name of the actual owners all funds received from Nigerians.

Question 10: How do you think Nigerians can help stop political corruption in Nigeria?

As depicted in the survey result below, 116 participants responded to this question. One hundred and ten of them agreed to one or more of the listed possible collective actions by Nigerians and the remaining 6 added new ideas under the "other" option. Two of the 6 respondents stated that they agreed with all the listed options, and one added that active participation of civil organisations in condemnation of political corruption would help to achieve the desired success in the fight against political corruption. Two others added that there was a need to change the values and mindset of Nigerians. One stated that the inclusion of anti-corruption education in the curriculum for students from primary to tertiary schools in Nigeria would help; and the remaining one stated that all the listed possible solutions have failed to combat political corruption in the past. Overall, all 116 (99%) respondents except one agreed that collective actions could curtail political corruption.



Q10 - How do you think Nigerians can help stop political corruption in Nigeria?

1	Demand a yearly publication of the salary/income vis-à-vis assets of politicians from the time they assume office until 10 years later	21.29%	79
2	Demand accountability for assets and moneys that exceed political leaders' normal salary/income	23.18%	86
3	Demand that any financial transfer over ₦500,000 be reported to banking regulators and anti-corruption authorities (e.g. EFCC, ICPC)	13.21%	49
4	Empower Nigeria's anti-corruption authorities (e.g.: EFCC and ICPC) and justice system to investigate, prosecute and sanction perpetrators of political corruption without meddling by political leaders	19.41%	72
5	Include anti-corruption education in the curriculum for students from primary to tertiary schools in Nigeria	18.87%	70
6	Other measures (Please specify below)	4.04%	15
			371



Per above, the respondents believe that transparency via publication of information regarding the incomes and expenses of political leaders would help to contain political corruption. Similar publication of public incomes and expenditures could also help to identify the holes through which public funds are stolen by political leaders and other public officials. As Cain (2014) argues regarding transparency, such publication will make a real difference if there are people and groups, journalists, and

civil society forces with a stake in the resources, to demand and ensure accountability through collective actions at home with support from the global community.

2. Interview

Seven Nigerians in developed countries were interviewed to understand why they emigrated from Nigeria and how political corruption contributed to their emigration decision.

Demographics

Education

One of them has a diploma in marketing; three have undergraduate/first degrees and three have master's degrees. Four of them are medical personnel – one is a scientist, with a master's degree; one is a Public Health Specialist with a master's degree: and two are nurses with first degrees. The above aligns with previous empirical findings regarding the exodus of Nigeria's medical personnel to developed countries (Okey, 2016; Anetoh & Onwudinjo, 2020; Ossai, et al., 2020).

Gender

The seven interviewees comprised three females and four males. The diploma holder is a male. The two nurses are a female and a male. The public health official is a female, the scientist is a male and the third master's degree holder is a female. The remaining first-degree holder is a male.

Age

The question was not explored during the interview due to cultural sensitivity to such questions in a one-on-one conversation. Considering that they are still working and based on the personal assessment of the researcher, they are all below 56 years.

Data on emigration

Six (86%) of them stated that they emigrated to developed countries for better life conditions – security, better job opportunities and quality education; and the one (14%) with the diploma stated that he resigned from Nigeria's public office to join his spouse in a developed country. His spouse is a Nigerian but the reason for her initial emigration from Nigeria to the developed country was not explored in this study.

The public health official decried the lack of facilities in public hospitals in Nigeria and cited some examples, including inadequate incubators for premature babies in a university teaching hospital and the medical doctors improvise by advising the parents to buy and use hot water bottles to preserve the lives of their premature babies. This corroborates the survey results and secondary data on the topic which were examined in this study regarding the cries of medical practitioners regarding a lack of functional medical facilities/equipment for their work in Nigeria, and the consequential effect on their decision to emigrate from Nigeria and accept employment offers in developed countries.

One hundred percent of them stated that they will immediately return to Nigeria if functional development infrastructures are in place in the country.

Political corruption

They all (100%) agreed that Nigeria is not poor and could readily afford development infrastructures akin to those in developed countries. They all also agreed that Nigeria's public funds, which could have been used to establish the infrastructures, are diverted by political leaders and other public officials for their private use at the detriment of the populace. The above confirms the evidence gathered in the survey and secondary data in this study.

Two of them added that apart from political corruption, other sectors in the country are corrupt and contribute to the underdevelopment in the country. One of the two added that the society corrupts even good political leaders.

Collective actions

All of them (100%) agreed that collective actions are pertinent to curb political corruption in Nigeria. They believe that education and sensitisation of Nigerians to the evils of corruption is the best option to stop the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria. This aligns with the results gathered in the survey and secondary data in this study.

Regarding help from industrialised countries to combat political corruption in Nigeria, five of them (71%) believe that though industrialised countries have the systems to detect and prevent laundered stolen public funds from entering their countries, they may refuse/are more likely to not stop such stolen funds from entering their countries because they use those funds to improve their economies. One of the five added that industrialised countries do not need to help Nigerians to stop political corruption in Nigeria, it is a task that Nigerians need to undertake on their own. The remaining two believe that industrialised countries can and will help by refusing to accept laundered stolen public funds in their countries, if more Nigerians speak up about the situation.

The above data corroborate the positions of most of the respondents in the survey. The main point that standout in the responses by the interviewees is that developed countries may not contribute to collective actions to stop laundering of stolen public funds from underdeveloped countries because the stolen public funds from

underdeveloped countries boost the economies of developed countries where they are laundered.

Chapter 3 – Findings and discussions of research data

Results and discussion of the research questions and hypotheses

A. Hypothesis 1: Political corruption is positively related to emigration

This paper explored how political corruption impacts involuntary emigration from developing countries to developed countries (**Research question 1**) and hypothesized that "political corruption is positively related to emigration" (**Hypothesis 1)**.

To understand the trajectories of emigration from developing countries to industrialised countries, it is pertinent to understand the underlying conditions that instigate flight from underdeveloped countries for survival in developed countries. These are discussed below, using the results and findings of this study as well as the positions of previous empirical studies on the topic.

Emigration

1. Survey data

Human inclination to migrate

The results of the survey and interviews in this research confirm inclination of Nigerians to emigrate to developed countries, per the results of responses to survey questions 1 and 2 for this research.

The above results also align with previous empirical studies, which found that countries with higher levels of unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment have higher rate of emigration, as people mainly emigrate to places with better opportunities for life, to enjoy functional infrastructures, and/or to unite with their family (Anetoh & Onwudinjo, 2020). The deplorable state of infrastructures and economic opportunities in Nigeria and other underdeveloped countries, instigates

mass emigration from the regions to industrialised countries, where they believe there are better opportunities for them to survive.

In 2021, a lack of functional security infrastructures and the consequential violence forcibly displaced 89.32m people from their homes (UNHCR, 2022). In 2021, there were 383,660 Nigerian refugees and 83,105 asylum seekers spread across the world (UNHCR, 2021) due to killings by Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen (Refworld, 2022). Over three million Nigerians were internally displaced as of December 2021 (IOM, n.a.). Conflict and violence in Nigeria North-East and natural disasters across the country accounted for 2.2m and 234,000 of the displacement respectively (IOM, 2022b, p. 18). The cause of the remaining 794,000 displacements is yet to be identified. As of August 2021, Nigeria was also home to about 73,000 foreign refugees, particularly from Cameroon (UNHCR, n.a.).

Notwithstanding the devastation of Covid-19, it is believed that about 100,000 Nigerians enrolled to study abroad (Alagbe, 2022). As of 2012, empirical evidence found that Africa loses about 250,000 scholars to industrialised countries yearly; about 30,000 Nigerian medical doctors were working abroad and 21,000 of them were working in the US (Odekunle, 2012). Emigration from West Africa to North America increased from 3 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2020, and from 12 percent to 19 percent in Europe (United Nations Population Division, 2020). The population of Nigeria was 211,400,708 as of July 2021 (World Population Prospects (2019), 2021). Migration records for 2021 indicate that about 46,087,411 Nigerians had emigrated as of July 2021 (Migration Policy Institute, 2021) and 1.6m of the Nigerian-emigrants moved to another West African Country (IOM, 2022b, p. 5).

The movement of people across territories/countries dates to the beginning of time; reshuffles human capital among countries; and has been portrayed as reducing unemployment in Africa or augmenting the workforce in industrialised countries. However, the brains drained from Africa to industrialised countries handicaps the continent's capability to develop and demand accountability from political oligarchs that have enthroned themselves in various countries across Africa and other underdeveloped countries. The continuous influx of migrants from underdeveloped countries into developed countries drains the budget of industrialised countries, which will in turn reduce their capacity to maintain their infrastructures.

Further, as the results of the interview in this research show, most emigrants from underdeveloped countries in developed countries would rather be in their own country of origin.

2. Interviews

Eighty-six percent (6 of the seven) interviewees that participated in this research corroborated the above data as they also emigrated to developed countries in search of better life conditions – security, better job opportunities, and quality education. The remaining one interviewee emigrated to unite with his spouse. The reasons for the spouse's emigration in the first instance was not explored.

Brain drain from Nigeria

One hundred and seventeen participants responded to the initial question (survey question 1) regarding their propensity to emigrate from Nigeria. One hundred and eight of them are university graduates. Fifty-eight of them are first degree holders and 50 are post-graduates. Ninety-one percent (53 respondents) and 82% (41 respondents) with first and post-graduate degrees respectively, affirmed their

receptivity to emigrate from Nigeria to developed countries because of the lack of better job opportunities/conditions and other development infrastructures in Nigeria. The results corroborate previous findings regarding brain drain from Nigeria (Odekunle, 2012; Anetoh & Onwudinjo, 2020) and/or continuous interest of Nigeria's intellectuals to emigrate to industrialised countries.

Why do nationals of developing countries emigrate to industrialised countries?

Migration is a part of human nature and should be encouraged, particularly when it is voluntarily embarked on. One hundred percent of educated Nigerians that were interviewed in this research indicated that the lack of functional infrastructures - security, educational and health facilities, and good work conditions – instigated their emigration from Nigeria. They indicated their preference to be home in Nigeria and would readily return home if adequate and proper infrastructures were put in place in Nigeria. As discussed in previous sections of this paper, the public funds stolen by Nigeria's political leaders are sufficient to establish world class infrastructures in Nigeria. However, the funds are either in the private pockets of Nigeria's political oligarchs and their cohorts abroad or withheld in industrialised countries where they were laundered by Nigeria's political leaders.

To understand why citizens of underdeveloped countries emigrate to developed countries, the results of survey question 3 and interviews in this research provide the answers. Hence only question 3 is used as the dependent variable to explore any relationships between political corruption and emigration.

Overall, 98.1% (101 out of 103) of the respondents to question 3 stated their reasons for emigration (emigration instigators) in the following order; 1.) Better security and safety; 2.) Better educational facilities; 3.) Better economic opportunities; 4.) Better

health facilities; 5.) Better reliable justice system; 6.) Less corruption; 7.) Better roads and transportation infrastructures; 8.) Cleaner environment and water; 9.) Re-union with family members abroad; 10.) Study and return to country of origin; and 11.) Tourism and return to country of origin.

The remaining two (1.9%) of the 103 respondents to survey question 3 wanted to visit developed countries and return to Nigeria.

Descriptive statistics

Per the descriptive statistics below, the distribution of the data for question 3 and the independent variable (political corruption) along with the demographics is platykurtic – more light-tailed as the kurtosis is less than 3. Thus, the distribution has fewer extreme outliers at either tail. The skewness results for emigration and political corruption are negative and between -0.5 and 0.5, thus they are fairly symmetrical.

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean		Std. Deviation	Variance	Skewness		Kurtosis	
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
Emigration - Question 3	135	2.00	.00	2.00	105.00	.7778	.03887	.45164	.204	-.847	.209	.012	.414

Political Corruption - Question 6	135	2.00	.00	2.00	117.00	.8667	.03292	.38245	.146	-1.332	.209	2.264	.414
Political Corruption - Question 7	135	1.00	.00	1.00	114.00	.8444	.03131	.36378	.132	-1.922	.209	1.720	.414
Political Corruption - Question 8	135	2.00	.00	2.00	140.00	1.0370	.04977	.57831	.334	.001	.209	.046	.414
Gender	135	2.00	3.00	5.00	518.00	3.8370	.05683	.66025	.436	.188	.209	-.717	.414
Age Groups	135	3.00	6.00	9.00	970.00	7.1852	.07881	.91574	.839	.688	.209	-.204	.414
Highest educational qualification	135	5.00	10.00	15.00	1519.00	11.2519	.13898	1.61485	2.608	1.579	.209	1.229	.414
Valid N (listwise)	135												

Test of variance between various groups' responses to question 3

Knowing that survey question 3 is the focus for emigration (dependent variable) as it details the reasons for emigration, the means of the various groups are computed using one-way ANOVA tests to determine if there is any difference between the

groups. Per the results below, there is a statistically significant difference in gender, age and educational level groups at p <.001. Gender is F(2,132) = 10.6, p < .001; for age, F(3,131) = 12.01, p < .001; and educational level is F(5,129) = 6.71, p < .001. Hence there are differences in all the groups as they did not result from mere chance.

Descriptives

Emigration - Question 3

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound	95% Confidence Interval for Mean Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Female	42	.7619	.43108	.06652	.6276	.8962	.00	1.00
Male	73	.8904	.39305	.04600	.7987	.9821	.00	2.00
Prefer not to say	20	.4000	.50262	.11239	.1648	.6352	.00	1.00
Total	135	.7778	.45164	.03887	.7009	.8547	.00	2.00

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	3.791	2	1.895	10.628	<.001
Within Groups	23.542	132	.178		
Total	27.333	134			

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound	95% Confidence Interval for Mean Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum

18-35	28	1.0000	.27217	.05143	.8945	1.1055	.00	2.00
36-55	72	.8472	.39929	.04706	.7534	.9410	.00	2.00
56 and above	17	.5882	.50730	.12304	.3274	.8491	.00	1.00
Didn't say	18	.3333	.48507	.11433	.0921	.5746	.00	1.00
Total	135	.7778	.45164	.03887	.7009	.8547	.00	2.00

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	5.896	3	1.965	12.010	<.001
Within Groups	21.437	131	.164		
Total	27.333	134			

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Post-graduate	50	.7600	.43142	.06101	.6374	.8826	.00	1.00
First degree	58	.9138	.38773	.05091	.8118	1.0157	.00	2.00
Secondary	7	1.0000	.00000	.00000	1.0000	1.0000	1.00	1.00
Vocation/trade	1	.0000	.	.	.	.	.00	.00
Primary	1	1.0000	.	.	.	.	1.00	1.00

Rather not say	18	.3333	.48507	.11433	.0921	.5746	.00	1.00
Total	135	.7778	.45164	.03887	.7009	.8547	.00	2.00

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	5.644	5	1.129	6.714	<.001
Within Groups	21.689	129	.168		
Total	27.333	134			

The means of responses per gender indicate that the male population (with a mean of .89 and 88%) is more receptive to emigration from underdeveloped countries than females, who have .76 mean point and 87% affirmation of tendency to emigrate from underdeveloped countries. This corroborates Adepoju's (2005a) findings regarding male population's mobility from harsh environment in pre-colonial era.

How do the emigration instigators in this study relate to political corruption?

To answer the above research question 1, the possible impacts of political corruption on emigration were examined in questions 6-8. One hundred and fifteen participants responded to question 6 and 112 (97%) of them stated that though Nigeria has numerous natural resources that bring in enormous incomes, it remains underdeveloped because the public incomes are stolen by its political leaders for their private use at the detriment of the populace.

One hundred percent of the interviewees agreed with the view of the 112 survey participants regarding the deplorable state of Nigeria due to political corruption. Six

of the seven interviewees also confirmed that they emigrated from Nigeria to developed countries due to lack of development infrastructures in Nigeria. One hundred percent of the interviewees also affirmed that they would return to Nigeria if development infrastructures were established in the country.

Bearing in mind that the participants' reasons for their (inclination to) emigration from an underdeveloped country are documented in survey question 3 for this research, this question was used as the dependent variable while survey questions 6, 7 and 8 formed the data for political corruption.

To determine if emigration is impacted by political corruption, it is vital to understand if any relationships exist between them. The possibility of any relationship between them was explored through the lens of the first six emigration instigators – security and safety, education, economic opportunities, health, justice, less corruption, and roads and transportation infrastructures, which were discussed in previous sections and via data collected in survey question 3 vis-à-vis the data on political corruption, questions 6-8.

A two-tailed non-parametric correlation tests with Spearman and Kendall were conducted to examine the positive/negative association between emigration and political corruption. The above tests were chosen in lieu of parametric Pearson correlation because political corruption variable contained data that were not continuous.

The results are below.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Emigration - Question 3	.7778	.45164	135
Political Corruption - Question 6	.8667	.38245	135
Political Corruption - Question 7	.8444	.36378	135
Political Corruption - Question 8	1.0370	.57831	135

Nonparametric Correlations

Correlations

			Emigration - Question 3	Political Corruption - Question 6	Political Corruption - Question 7	Political Corruption - Question 8
Kendall's tau_b	Emigration - Question 3	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.315**	.426**	.220**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	<.001	<.001	.008
		N	135	135	135	135
	Political Corruption - Question 6	Correlation Coefficient	.315**	1.000	.874**	.536**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	<.001	.	<.001	<.001
		N	135	135	135	135
	Political Corruption - Question 7	Correlation Coefficient	.426**	.874**	1.000	.530**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	<.001	<.001	.	<.001
		N	135	135	135	135
	Political Corruption - Question 8	Correlation Coefficient	.220**	.536**	.530**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.008	<.001	<.001	.
		N	135	135	135	135

Spearman's rho	Emigration - Question 3	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.319**	.429**	.230**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	<.001	<.001	.007
		N	135	135	135	135
	Political Corruption - Question 6	Correlation Coefficient	.319**	1.000	.880**	.558**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	<.001	.	<.001	<.001
		N	135	135	135	135
	Political Corruption - Question 7	Correlation Coefficient	.429**	.880**	1.000	.551**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	<.001	<.001	.	<.001
		N	135	135	135	135
	Political Corruption - Question 8	Correlation Coefficient	.230**	.558**	.551**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.007	<.001	<.001	.
		N	135	135	135	135

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The above non-parametric correlation results indicate that there is a positive statistically significant correlation between emigration instigators and political corruption. The number of participants remained 135 for all the analysis. The results for Kendall's correlation between emigration instigators and survey question 6 are: r =.315 and p <.001; emigration and survey question 7: r =.426 and p <.001; and emigration versus survey question 8: r =.220 at p = .008. The above results confirm Hypothesis 1 of this research.

Spearman correlation tests also aligned with Hypothesis 1, per the results of positive correlation between the variables. Spearman correlation coefficient for emigration and survey question 6 (why underdeveloped countries lack functional infrastructures in spite of their enormous natural resources) is r = 319 and p <.001; for emigration and survey question 7 (how political leaders spend their stolen public funds), r =.426 and p <.001 while emigration and survey question 8 – (in-)sufficiency of the remuneration

of political leaders vis-à-vis their extravagant spending/lifestyle - is r = .230 and p = .007. Hence an increase in political corruption in underdeveloped countries results in an increase in emigration from such countries, which confirms **Hypothesis 1** -Political corruption is positively related to emigration. Consequently, the **null hypothesis (hypothesis 2)** that there is no relationship between political corruption and emigration is rejected.

In addition to the positive and statistically significant correlation between emigration and political corruption; the correlation between responses to the questions on political corruption, per survey questions 6 and 7, is also moderately strong; but the correlation is weak for question 8. The correlation between questions 6, 7 and 8 are also positively strong, with the strongest correlation being between questions 6 and 7 at r = .874; followed by the correlation between questions 6 and 8 when r = .536; and questions 7 and 8 at r = .530.

Chapter 4 - Collective actions

Hypothesis 3: Supranational collective action could facilitate containment of political corruption and political corruption could prevent collective actions

As the results in previous sections show, 115 (98.29%) out of 117 respondents agreed on the necessity of global efforts to curtail political corruption while 2 (1.71%) dissented. All 115 (99%) respondents except one (1%) agreed that national collective actions could curtail political corruption. Hence local and global collective actions could help curtail political corruption, which in turn could remediate the deplorable development issues that instigate emigration from underdeveloped countries. Conversely, corruption and emigration could also make collective actions for reform more difficult by facilitating the departure of citizens and groups who might otherwise push hard for better domestic government policies.

Collective actions are explored in this study as possible remediation avenues to prevent political corruption with its consequential involuntary emigration. The collective actions discussed below could facilitate containment or prevent political corruption that instigate emigration from underdeveloped countries to developed countries.

National collective actions to contain political actions

Underdeveloped countries can undertake several collective actions to curb political corruption, with a view to containing involuntary emigration and retaining its intellectuals. This paper proffers the following solutions to help solve the problems.

1. Remove the impediments to implementation of anti-corruption measures in Nigeria

Gbajumo (2022a) reviewed Nigeria's anti-corruption laws and institutions and found that they contain several loopholes that permit corruption. The prevalence of political corruption persists in Nigeria because its containment is impeded by various factors, including its anti-corruption institutions and laws, and oligarchy powered by nepotism. Nigeria has several anti-corruption laws that are opaque and stipulate different punishments for the same crime of corruption. For instance, the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act (ICPC) (Nigeria Government, 2000), which is administered by the ICPC, provides stricter punishment for all parties involved in all forms of corruption, unlike the EFCC Act (Nigeria Government, 2004a), the Nigeria Criminal Code (Nigeria Government, 1990), Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act 1995, Money Laundering Act (Nigeria Government, 2004b) and other anti-corruption laws in Nigeria. However, the EFCC Act is recognised as the main anti-corruption law in Nigeria and EFCC is designated as Nigeria's anti-corruption institution, as required by Article 6 of UNCAC. The anti-corruption laws are overly lenient to corrupt political leaders than commoners who steal lesser amounts from private individuals.

The EFCC seems to have been established to water-down implementation of anti-corruption measures by the ICPC. As history and empirical studies show, the EFCC is a political tool used by the ruling political party to prosecute and control their political opponents (Folarin, 2009; Albert & Okoli, 2016). Unless the above loopholes are covered, political corruption will remain unabated in Nigeria.

2. Remediations to improve anti-corruption compliance in Nigeria

The following are suggestions to curtail political corruption. While they are within the purview of Nigerians, considering the security situation in the country and harm suffered by proponents (e.g., Dr Ngozi Okoja-Iweala) of anti-corruption in the country, supranational efforts (e.g., sanctions on individual corrupt political/public officials and their immediate family members) could facilitate implementation of the suggestions and prevent harm to other anti-corruption proponents.

Demand for accountability: Decision-making processes that are available and can be verified by the public facilitate accountability for actions undertaken by public officials (UNODC, 2020). Transparency and reduction of direct interactions between public officials and users of public services are pertinent to curtail political corruption. These could be established through public polls, blogs, e-Government, and artificial intelligence/robotics to enhance verifications and assessments of public services.

a. **Public polls**: This is often used to sample opinions during political elections. Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/) could use the same method to collect data on public opinions to ascertain the level of political corruption in public institutions and improve the effectiveness of public services. Such polls could start with students, who are the future of Nigeria.

b. **Electronic voters' card and electronic election system**: This would avert the incessant hijacking and circumvention of elections by corrupt political oligarchs and their cohorts. When politicians succeed in the polls without corrupt practices, they will have no 'debt' to pay for political godfatherism and their propensity to indulge in political corruption would be minimised.

c. **Blogs** – Blogs can be created for the public to discuss and comment on the quality of public services, including public procurement, gifts and hospitality, health services in public hospitals, and quality of education in public schools.

d. **e-Government and e-Procurement** – Evidence abound that technology enhances effective delivery of public service and reduces political corruption by reducing interactions between public service users and public officials.

   Similarly, procurement of public services (permits/licences for extraction of petroleum and solid minerals; national identity cards, passports, driver's licence, job applications and recruitment process for public offices, tax declarations and payments etc.) should be completely online. Request for upload of relevant documents, and payment for the services should be through a dedicated portal on the website of the responsible public office. The process could be manned by artificial intelligence powered robotics to avoid the usual effects of nepotism, extortion, bribery, misappropriation and embezzlement.

e. **Artificial intelligence (AI) powered robotics** can replace humans to verify eligibility and completeness of requests for public goods/services; due diligence; and judicial process, including preparation of unbiased sentencing. The above deter criminality and would reinstate confidence in public service as justice would be more certain and proportionate without fear of favour (Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980).

f. **Physical access to public offices by requesters of public service:** Public access to public offices should be restricted to areas manned by interactive robots.

g. **Installation of close circuit televisions (CCTV) and visitors' badges with in-built body camera**: Should the public require access to the restricted areas in public buildings, they should have visitor's badge with body camera that will be monitored, recorded and archived by the robots installed in the office. The badges should be placed on the visitors and removed by the robots. Recording of the visitors' movements and actions should be published for public scrutiny.

There are institutions to implement the foregoing suggestions in Nigeria. For instance, the Bureau of Public Procurement, which joined the World Bank to establish Nigeria's public e-Procurement system, (Osoba, 2022) could add AI robots to enhance the system. The National Information Technology Development Agency, which established e-Government in Nigeria (NITDA, 2022), can include the suggested transparency measures in its system.

h. Incentivisation – positive and negative

Reporting of political corruption and compliance with anti-corruption laws/measures could be encouraged through incentivisation. For instance, the first person/institution/country to report corruption or money laundering gets two percent of the total stolen money in question. Gneezy, Meler and Biel (2011) found that the success of financial incentives is short-term and Bènabou and Tirole (2008) added that such incentives result in unethicality. Thus, financial reward does not work for

everyone, particularly females, egoists and altruists (Lacetera & Macis, 2010a; Simpson & Willer, 2008). Non-cash symbolic rewards – medals, certificates, public recognition, credits, etc. – have been proven to be more successful (Lacetera & Macis, 2010b). The US DOJ also recorded success with cooperation credit for corporate self-reporting (Arlen & Buell, 2019; US DOJ, 2015; US DOJ, 2018).

Supranational collective actions

In this section, secondary data is explored to ascertain "how and why supranational collective actions could contain political corruption", research question 2 for this research.

Why industrialised countries need to care about political corruption in underdeveloped countries

a. Financial burden for clearing the consequences of political corruption in underdeveloped countries

Almost all industrialised countries earmark a reasonable portion of their income (taxes paid by their citizens and other residents) to cater for migrants, majority of whom are from underdeveloped countries that are impoverished due to political corruption. However, only few of the industrialised countries temporarily benefit from the corrupt proceeds laundered to industrialised countries by political leaders and public officials from underdeveloped countries. The financial burden that results from political corruption could be avoided through global collective actions. For instance, a ban on receipt of funds above the known remuneration of political leaders/public officials is one way to tackle laundering of corrupt proceeds by political leaders/public officials from underdeveloped countries. President Abacha's official salary and other allowances for his entire term in office amounted to ₦82,595,557 (approx.

$3,754,434.533) but he laundered about $5bn through US banks to the UK, Switzerland, France, Germany, Lichtenstein, and Luxembourg (Aljazeera, 2020). Overall, the total official salaries and allowances plus loans for political leaders and senior public officials in Nigeria are less than ₦150m for their usual two-term 8 years in public office. Per the current exchange rate, that is about $355,3074 and was less than $5m during the regime of those indicted for political corruption. However, the known least amount laundered to industrialised countries is $40m by Governor Diepreye. The destination-countries for the laundered corrupt proceeds remain the same, mainly Switzerland, UK and US. The United Arab Emirates is another location where most Nigeria's political leaders are stashing their funds. There are also other new safe havens for laundering public funds stolen from Nigeria by its political leaders/public officials.

Contrary to the main recipients of the laundered stolen public funds from underdeveloped countries, the main recipient-countries for migrants from underdeveloped countries are in Europe – Italy, Spain, Greece, Germany and France. The results of this study indicate a change in propensity in emigration from Nigeria in favour of Canada, followed closely by the US, UK and Australia.

The European Union countries

The cost of bills for catering for migrants in Europe is paid by the 27-member-countries (UK Government, n.a.) in the European Union (EU), which contribute to cater for the emigrants from Nigeria and other developing countries that enter the EU.

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[3] Exchange rate of Nigerian Naira to US dollars in 1993 was 22:1. Retrieved from: https://qz.com/africa/564513/a-not-so-brief-history-of-the-fall-and-fall-of-the-nigerian-naira/#:~:text=By%20the%20time%20IBB%20left,for%2017%20naira%20to%20%241 [Accessed on 25 June 2022]

[4] Retrieved from: https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=USD&To=NGN [Accessed on 28 August 2022]

EU budget for immigrants in its region (European Union, n.a) includes 1.) The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) - 2014-2020 - €3.137bn and 2021-2027 – €9.9bn; and 2.) The European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) - €99.3bn for 2021-2027 – this is a major financing source for EU's medium- and long-term integration initiatives.

With the exit of the UK from the EU, Switzerland is the only main beneficiary of corrupt proceeds from Nigeria in the EU, but it has few, if any Nigerian-migrants who require social services. Why should the remaining 26 EU countries continue to drain their citizens' tax contributions to clear the consequences of political corruption that other countries enjoy? This is one of the questions other members of EU need to answer while considering the need for collective actions to combat political corruption in Nigeria.

The UK which receives the bulk of corrupt proceeds from Nigeria exited the EU in January 2020. Hence, it no longer contributes to the EU's budget earmarked to care for migrants from Nigeria and other developing countries that enter EU countries.

The UK

As evidenced by empirical and historic evidence discussed in previous sections of this paper, the UK is a perpetual beneficiary of laundered stolen public funds from Nigeria. As per the available evidence and confirmed by the UK Migration Observatory, immigrants in the UK "contributes more to government revenue" than the cost of UK's care for them (The Migration Observatory, 2022). The UK spends £1.5bn annually to care for asylum seekers during assessment of their asylum claims. In 2021, 28,526 migrants entered the UK and claimed asylum (UK Government, 2022). Considering the

amount of Nigeria's stolen public funds laundered to the UK vis-à-vis the above cost of its care for migrants in its economy, UK's engrossment in political corruption and receipt of corrupt proceeds from Nigeria is presently lucrative and UK may be unwilling to give that up without pressure from the international community. The continuous influx of migrants from Nigeria into the UK, which is the third migration destination-country on the preference list of (potential) Nigerian-migrants as evidenced by data collected in this study, could quickly devour the profits from the political corruption.

The Americas – Canada

In the Americas, Canada is the number one destination-country on the preference list for Nigerian-migrants but there is no evidence that it benefits from the corrupt proceeds of stolen public funds by Nigeria's corrupt political leaders and other senior public officials. While Nigerian migrants could positively contribute to the economy of Canada, Canada does not need to drain its budget to cater for them before they are absorbed into the system. If there is no political corruption in Nigeria that forces Nigerians to emigrate, they could migrate to Canada voluntarily and be prepared to care for themselves until they find a job there. So far in 2022, Canada has contributed $514.52m to support food supply across the globe, including $1.4m, $22m to Kenya and South Sudan respectively (OCHA Reliefweb, 2022). It also contributed $73m to support drought relief in Ethiopia (Canadian Government, 2022). Between 2001 and 2003, Canada committed $6bn to assist Africa (United Nations, 2003). In the 2019-2020 fiscal year, Canada spent $6.6bn on global assistance (Canadian Government, 2021).

The Americas – the US

The US built walls around its border to prevent immigrants from its shores. The walls cost $46m per mile and the estimated coverage is 52 miles (The White House, 2021). It spends $582m annually to resettle refugees (The Washington Post, 2015). The above notwithstanding, the migrants have no freedom in their destination-countries as they would in their own countries, if their public funds are used to build their economy instead of being stolen and laundered to developed countries by the political leaders and other public officials in Nigeria.

Generally, the EU, US and UK also make varying donations to support development and other causes in underdeveloped countries. Are the donations and loans used for the intended purposes or siphoned through political corruption back to the usual safe havens for stolen public funds from underdeveloped countries? Why should a few industrialised countries continue to drain their countries' budgets to support underdeveloped countries, which are rich if they are not burdened by political corruption? The answers to the above questions could be found in subsequent research. This paper posits that it would be in everyone's interest to jointly combat political corruption in underdeveloped countries and return all laundered stolen public funds to its country of origin.

b. Weak or weakened anti-corruption measures and institutions

Available evidence purports that anti-corruption laws and institutions in industrialised countries are effective. The effectiveness is attested to by the stringent measures they have in place to prevent public funds from leaving their countries. However, similar measures are not adhered to when stolen public funds are laundered to the industrialised countries from Nigeria and other underdeveloped countries. What alternative explanation is there for the billions of US dollars from underdeveloped

countries that infiltrate the economy of industrialised countries? Corrupt political/public officials from underdeveloped countries use their laundered stolen public funds to live in grandeur in industrialised countries as they purchase the most luxurious goods – poshest houses, cars, yachts, and live in the wealthiest neighbourhoods; buy the finest and most expensive diamonds, gold and other precious gems; pay high taxes on their property; pay for education of their children in the most expensive schools; buy citizenship; and enjoy extravagant holidays without detection by the effective law enforcement agencies and measures in industrialised countries. A mere comparison of their legal salaries and incomes vis-à-vis the cost of their extravagant lifestyles should normally put them on the radar of law enforcement agencies.

The downside is that the more stolen foreign public funds are allowed to permeate anti-corruption systems in developed countries, corruption will gradually seep through and demolish the otherwise robust systems. Further, the political leaders/pubic officials who are assisted to launder stolen public funds to industrialised countries know that the anti-corruption systems in industrialised countries are not as effective-proof as propagated. Over time, the hypocrisy gradually becomes more visible to the populace of underdeveloped countries, as evidence gathered in this study attests to.

c. Damage to reputation and values of industrialised countries

Reputation is based on several factors, including prevailing culture, integrity and values (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). Industrialised countries flaunt their integrity and reliable institutions for accountability. Their accountability frameworks and values have been enacted into global agreements and used as yardsticks to measure global

development because of the perception that their anti-corruption systems work. The continuous pretence regarding entry of stolen public funds into their economies from underdeveloped countries is becoming too obvious to many that the flaunted values are either non-existent or deliberately jettisoned to benefit from political corruption in underdeveloped countries. The situation creates a perception of hypocrisy by industrialised countries and could make other countries disregard their workable values that could maintain global development.

How global collective action could help to contain political corruption

Global collective action is pertinent to combat political corruption in underdeveloped countries because the spillover hurts everyone. Political corruption undermines global development, including the SDGs. As illustrated in Figure 2 above, corruption-migration cycle goes round and hurts everyone in the long-term. Available evidence indicates that even industrialised countries are suffering the burden of catering for emigrants from underdeveloped countries. Continuous influx of emigrants from corruption-riddled countries into developed economies would continue to strain the budgets of the latter countries, particularly if they have no additional means of increasing their incomes to meet the rate of migration into their countries. Over time, the expenditures could outweigh their incomes. Before that stage, they could reach a political breaking point as the voters begin to complain about footing the bill for the immigrants (National Post, 2015). Though nationals of industrialised countries often do not realise how much immigrant workers contribute to their host countries' economies or their countries' contribution to the political corruption situation of the emigrants' underdeveloped countries, the reality shows that if 'illegal' immigrants were to suddenly leave the industrialised countries, different sectors of their economy would be negatively affected. The developed countries' political objections to

contribute to collective actions to combat political corruption in underdeveloped countries do have their effects on their economies and citizens. Emigrants from corrupt countries would find another viable country to settle. This way, the cycle becomes a never-ending process. However, the cycle could be halted if political corruption, which is, per the position of this paper, the foundation of the problems of underdevelopment - poverty and a lack of infrastructures – that compel emigration from underdeveloped countries to developed economies is properly addressed.

How supranational efforts can combat political corruption and end involuntary emigration from underdeveloped countries into developed countries

Evidence gathered in this study indicates that most educated citizens of underdeveloped countries are compelled to emigrate to developed countries because of a lack of adequate and functional infrastructures in their countries. Their countries are impoverished by their political leaders, who steal and launder their public funds to industrialised countries. This paper posits that there are three main ways that supranational collective actions could contain political corruption with its consequences.

a. **Refuse stolen public funds from underdeveloped countries**

Record of the legitimate salaries and allowances of political/senior public officials in Nigeria is publicly available on the internet and annexed to this paper. Similar records for other underdeveloped countries are also available or such records should become public documents. If all developed countries refuse/confiscate and return any amount above the known legal/published incomes of political/public officials, corrupt political

leaders/senior public officials would reduce/stop political corruption, just like thieves will stop stealing if they have no markets to sell their stolen wares.

The researcher plans to upload such available documents on her website - https://www.integrityplus.org/ - that she created as her contribution to anti-corruption collective actions. The researcher hopes to continue to use and maintain the website for anti-corruption materials, particularly for education awareness/sensitisation on anti-corruption issues.

b. Delays in returning stolen public funds: A call to repeal Article 50 of UNCAC (2004).

Article 50 of UNCAC provides for "controlled delivery" (UNODC, 2004, p. 41), which allows transit of illicit funds to safely travel enroute all its points and arrive its destination under the watch of law enforcers. The goal of this provision is to facilitate identification of perpetrators at all ends. While the objective could help in cleaning the society of more parties to corruption, evidence has proven that there are prolonged delays in identification/declaration and return of stolen public funds by industrialised countries-recipients of the stolen public funds while the origins/owners of the laundered funds, mainly Nigeria and other underdeveloped countries, languish in poverty and unsuccessfully beg for the return of their stolen funds.

The stolen funds are often absorbed into the economy of the recipient country and not released. For instance, a leak unveils that Credit Suisse held 100bn Swiss Francs (£80bn) illicit funds from mainly underdeveloped countries, and some of the accounts were opened in the 1940s and some of the clients are deceased (The Guardian, 2022). The known stolen public funds, which were looted by President Abacha before his

death in 1998, have yet to be fully repatriated to Nigeria. In February 2022, there was news of $321m of the stolen funds being returned to Nigeria by Switzerland (Reuters, 2022) and in May 2022, UK said it recovered $23m from the Nigeria's stolen public funds by Abacha (Premium Times, 2022b). In both instances, the recovery and planned return of the laundered stolen public funds occurred in 2022, 24 years after the death of Abacha and receipt of the stolen public funds in developed countries, as Abacha could not have laundered the stolen public funds after his death. In the 24 years, Nigeria had borrowed funds from industrialised countries and international development banks at exorbitant cost and submersed deeper in debts; and thousands of Nigerians were killed in the deserts or died on seas as they fled the scourge of poverty and insecurity in their crumbled economy due to Nigeria's public funds that were stolen by Abacha and other political/public officials. This paper posits that Article 50 of UNCAC is repugnant to the goals of global development and human rights of the origin-countries and citizens of laundered stolen public funds. The pain far outweighs the benefits of the controlled delivery enshrined in UNCAC and it should be repealed. Laundering of stolen public funds should be halted at the origin country or first transit point, published and returned to the origin-country within 30 days maximum from the date of discovery/confiscation in foreign country.

c. **Establishment of a Global Investigative Body and court for political corruption**

Considering the universality of political corruption and the egregious harm it causes to common citizens across the world – poverty and underdevelopment in underdeveloped countries; strained incomes of industrialised countries due to catering for migrants from underdeveloped countries; and the hindrance to accomplishment of the SDGs - there is a need to establish a Global Anti-Corruption Investigative Body, under the auspices of the United Nations, with a mandate to

investigate and prosecute political corruption; prevent, detect as well as recover and return stolen public funds to its origin country within 30 days. Anti-corruption laws in the country of origin of the stolen public funds should apply. The prosecution and punishment should also be in the country/owner of the stolen public funds. A percentage of the recovered stolen funds can be used to fund the Global Body.

d. **Engage in global anti-corruption awareness**

In addition to anti-corruption measures by individual countries, tackling political corruption from all fronts is imperative to contain the monster. The future can be structured today by educating children and youths on the vices of political corruption to avoid a reoccurrence of the present cataclysm caused by political corruption in our world. Inclusion of anti-corruption awareness and community service in school curriculum in all countries would help ingrain required anti-corruption values in future generations. The researcher has developed some anti-corruption education materials and plans to continue after this programme at IACA.

e. Sanction individual corrupt political leaders instead of the entire country

The international community often uses its stick of sanctions to instill corrective measures. However, the punishment for corrupt practices in a country is sometimes directed at the country instead of the actual perpetrators. This only increases the affliction of the downtrodden population and has often been unsuccessful or yields minimal success after prolonged suffering of the poor populace. The sanctions would record more successes if they are directed at individual corrupt politicians and their immediate family members. For instance, revoke their purchased citizenship of industrialised countries; ban the politicians' and their immediate family members

from entering industrialised countries, and withdraw their children from schools in industrialised countries.

Conclusions

Evidence gathered in this study confirms findings in previous empirical studies that emigration instigators from developing countries include poverty and a lack of adequate reliable development infrastructures, including access to secured and safe environment, quality education, functional health care. This paper further finds that the emigration instigators result from political corruption, as the public funds that would have been used to establish the infrastructures are stolen and laundered abroad for the private use of political leaders of underdeveloped countries.

As prevalence of political corruption continues to instigate emigration, the educated citizens are driven out of underdeveloped countries for survival and access to better life conditions in developed countries. Consequently, developing countries are deprived of intellectuals that could have remediated underdevelopment in their countries. This, in turn, is tantamount to failure in the achievement of the SDGs and the planned global development.

The above situations and their treble effects could be remedied through global collective action, including one possible solution detailed below.

Global Collective Actions

Considering that political corruption hurts everyone in the long-run, and that the continuous outflow of educated citizens of developing countries to developed countries poses a significant danger to the achievement of the SDGs and global

development, it is pertinent that both developing countries and the international community join hands to collectively remediate political corruption in developing countries. This paper proffers anti-corruption education as a possible collective action that the international community can collaborate with developing countries to jointly combat corruption in our world.

Knowing the inclination towards technology by children and youths of today, developers of games and films could focus on creating anti-corruption games and films to facilitate anti-corruption awareness. The researcher developed some anti-corruption educational materials on Scratch - https://scratch.mit.edu/projects/722217205/, a website frequented by young students and their teachers. At the time of writing this report, 47 persons had viewed the video. The researcher also created a website - https://www.integrityplus.org/ - for the above materials, and a repository for anti-corruption laws, news and other related materials. The above project is aimed to be a global platform for anti-corruption educational awareness. Similar anti-corruption education has been included in school curriculum in Fiji (OCCRP, 2019) and China (Wong, n.a.).

The researcher plans to develop a video game from the board card game below (Gbajumo, 2022b), which she had developed during her study at IACA, as a part of the anti-corruption educational awareness initiative. The board game depicts how corruption is perpetrated during requests for public services; an option to adhere to integrity; how corrupt public officials could be held accountable; whistleblowers rewarded; and corrupt officials punished or rewarded, depending on their choice to violate or adhere to required ethicality.

The researcher is working on other similar board and online games as well as video games and films to raise global awareness on the necessity of anti-corruption for the good of all. The researcher plans to produce and collaborate with Netflix, Disney and/or other telecommunications services and education agencies/institutions to raise awareness of anti-corruption in the world. The above anti-corruption materials would be tailored for use by all, particularly students of all ages. The future starts now, and the future could be secured from the harm of corruption if we teach the younger generations to adhere to anti-corruption requirements.

The above anti-corruption education strategies are ways a willing international community can help Nigeria and other underdeveloped countries to combat political and other forms of corruption. This would, in turn, contribute to the planned achievement of the SDGs and global development, which would, in turn, reduce involuntary emigration from developing countries for better conditions in developed countries.


Unsorted
Coalition Against Corruption in Coal Mining (CACOM) – Home
Coalition Against Corruption in Coal Mining (CACOM) – https://www.cacom-laca.org/
Photo by Markus Winkler
Home - Start Here!
Anti-corruption integrity-honesty board game
1 board, 9 cards
Photo by charlesdeluvio
Government official demands a money to give the public service
Photo by Christian Dubovan
Will you give the money or not?
Photo by Maartje Seeteln
The Public in need of public service for . . . (slot in public school, birth certificate, driver's licence, treatment in public hospital . . .)
Photo by Ye Jinghao
The Police, acting on the instruction of the Court, send the Government Official to jail for asking for and receiving money from the public to provide public service.
If the public gave the money to the Government Official, the public will also go to jail too.
Photo by John Cameron
Money not given, police arrests the Government Official that demanded to be paid by the public.
If the public gives the money, the police arrests both the public for giving the money and the Government Official for taking the money.
Photo by ev
Money not given, the public reports to the police.
Money given, other standers-by report to the police or the police sees the public giving the money.
Will you report the Government Official for asking for money to provide public service?
Photo by Roger Harris
The public did not give the money and is applauded for the good work!
Photo by 张涛
The public also gets a medal of 'good citizen' for not giving the money to the Government official.
If the Government Official provides the public service to the public without asking for any money, the Government official will also be applauded and be given a medal of 'good citizen'!

Recommendations

This paper posits that political corruption is tameable and its consequential effects on involuntary emigration and underdevelopment are avoidable, if the world is willing to prevent them.

Consequently, this paper recommends that possible ways of remediating the situations include:

1.Global collective actions, including anti-corruption education of present and future generations.

2. Correction of loopholes that permit political corruption, including covering of the gaps in anti-corruption laws and institutions, particularly those identified in Nigeria's anti-corruption system.

3. Repeal of Article 50 of UNCAC regarding "controlled delivery", as it is repugnant, and favours developed countries at the detriment of citizens of underdeveloped countries.

4. Implementation of proper incentivisation for reporting political corruption in developing countries and the resultant laundered funds in developed countries.

5. Establishment of a Global Investigative Body and Court to prosecute political corruption perpetrated by political leaders to protect the lives and human rights of common citizens across the globe.

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Appendixes

1. **Research survey results** Survey result - Default Report.pdf
2. **Summary of interviews with research participants** Summary of interviews with rese
3. **Remuneration of Nigeria public services officials (data for 2007-2009)** Remuneration package for Nigeria
4. **Survey data**
Survey%20data%20(Appendix).xlsx

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Publisher & Layout:
International Anti-Corruption Academy

Muenchendorfer Strasse 2
2361 Laxenburg, Austria

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www.iaca.int